Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement
Working paper n°: 122
Unit: Welfare State and Taxation
Author(s): Audinga Baltrunaite, Cristina Giorgiantonio, Sauro Mocetti and Tommaso Orlando.
Public procurement outcomes depend on the ability of the procuring agency to select well-performing suppliers. Should public administrations be granted more or less discretion in their decision making? Using Italian data on municipal public works tendered in the period 2009-2013, we study how a reform extending the scope of bureaucrat discretion affects supplier selection. We find that the share of contracts awarded to politically connected firms increases while the (ex-ante) labor productivity of the winning firm decreases, thus suggesting a potential misallocation of the public funds. These effects are concentrated among lower quality procuring agencies.
Audinga Baltrunaite Bank of Italy
Cristina Giorgiantonio Bank of Italy
Sauro Mocetti Bank of Italy
Tommaso Orlando Bank of Italy
The paper may be downloaded here.
Last updated 19 June 2018 - 09:09:53