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# Gendered parenthood-employment gaps in midlife: A demographic perspective across three different welfare systems

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## Abstract

Women's labor force participation has increased remarkably in western countries, but important gender gaps still remain, especially among parents. This paper uses a novel comparative perspective assessing women's and men's mid-life employment trajectories by parity and education. We provide new insight into the gendered parenthood penalty by analyzing the long-term implications, beyond the core childbearing ages by decomposing years lived between ages 40 to 74 into years in employment, inactivity, and retirement. We compare three countries with very different institutional settings and cultural norms: Finland, Italy, and the U.S. Our empirical approach uses the multistate incidence-based life table method. Our results document large cross-national variation, and the key role that education plays. In Finland years employed increase with parity for women and men and the gender gap is small; in the U.S. the relation between parity and years employed is relatively flat whereas among those with two or more children a gender gap emerges; and in Italy, years employed decreases sharply with parity for women, and increases for men. Education elevates years employed similarly for all groups in Finland; but in the U.S and Italy, highly educated mothers experience only half of the gender gap compared to low-educated mothers. The employment trajectories of childless women and men differ greatly across countries.

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## Introduction

In 2021, the employment rate of U.S. mothers of children aged under 18 was 68%, while for fathers, the corresponding rate was 89%, 21 percentage points higher (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2022). In EU countries<sup>1</sup>, the corresponding mothers' employment rate was 72%, while for fathers it was 90%, with considerable variation across countries (Eurostat 2022). Despite the remarkable growth in women's labor force participation over the last century (e.g., Goldin 2014), these numbers suggest that the roles of motherhood and worker remain difficult to combine.

Vast evidence documents motherhood wage and occupational penalties: compared to fathers and childless women, mothers tend to have more discontinuous careers and more difficulties in career progression. Past research, with some contributions dating back decades (Becker 1981), identifies motherhood as one of the most critical factors responsible for the gender gaps in the labor market (e.g., Aisenbrey and Fasang 2017; Killewald and Zhuo 2019; Musick, Gonalons-Pons, and Schwartz 2022). The negative effect of motherhood on employment and wages operates through different mechanisms, the most immediate being the short-term interruption in paid work following childbirth (Gangl and Ziefle 2009) and the loss of work experience that could have lasting consequences in the long-term (Kahn, García-Mangano, and Bianchi 2014).

Although the gender gap in employment and wages originates early in the life course (Combet and Oesch 2019), most of the gender differences in employment and wages can be attributed to the lasting consequences of childbearing (Budig and England 2001), the burden of which mainly falls on mothers (Treas and Drobnič 2010). The disadvantages are likely to accumulate as the number of children grows (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2016; Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020; Doren 2019a; Kahn et al. 2014). The gender gaps are consistently found across countries, but the size of the penalties varies between different institutional and cultural contexts (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2016; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2012; Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Muller, Hiekel, and Liefbroer 2020).

The wage gap is only a part of women's and mothers' disadvantage in the labor market. A focus limited to the investigation of wages, increases the risk of overlooking other long-lasting consequences for mothers and societies. Working fewer hours or leaving work to care for children endangers future salaries and career prospects (Killewald and Zhuo 2019; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007), increasing the risk of economic insecurity at older ages (Muller et al. 2020). The consequences of mothers' leaving or reducing work participation are becoming increasingly important for Western countries where population aging necessarily calls for a substantial extension of working lives to guarantee the sustainability of welfare systems.

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<sup>1</sup> EU 27

A recent strand of the literature draws attention to the long-term consequences of motherhood on the employment trajectories of women (Kahn et al. 2014; Killewald and Zhuo 2019; Muller et al. 2020; Weisshaar and Cabello-Hutt 2020). While there is evidence on how gender disparities in the labor market grow with age (Goldin 2014), there is limited evidence on how the employment trajectories of mothers unfold at midlife (Jalovaara and Fasang 2020; Kahn et al. 2014; Muller et al. 2020), when most women have completed their childbearing and the childcare burden is usually less heavy compared to earlier ages. Moreover, in light of the increased gender equality in attitudes toward mother's and father's roles in society and the family, a complementary perspective investigating the impact of the number of children on fathers' employment and wage trajectories is also very important (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2022; Sigle-Rushton, Goisis, and Keizer 2013). Evidence shows that fathers enjoy small wage premiums, career advantages, and occupational stability as compared to childless men, and these advantages even tend to increase with the number of children, though their strength seems to vary across countries too (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2022; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2013).

In this study, our first contribution is to illustrate the implications of fertility for the remaining years of life spent in employment at age 40, considering the age span between the core childbearing years and retirement. We analyze the entire population of women and men from age 40 to 74, because differently from much past research that focuses on analyzing wages and thus selects only employed individuals, our interest lies in within and between gender inequalities across parities. We summarize employment trajectories of women and men as expected years of employment by parity, which allows us to identify how parity intersects with employment trajectories among women and men.

Overall, we hypothesize that mothers with a larger number of children are likely to have experienced more work interruptions, accumulated less work experience, and early human capital depreciation. Contrarywise, given that fatherhood does not impose severe obstacles to men's labor market participation, we generally expect larger gender gaps in employment trajectories at higher parities. Fewer employment opportunities and comparatively high rates of labor market withdrawal among mothers with more children may contribute to early and permanent retirement. Alternatively, those with more disrupted working careers might need to work longer to compensate for the lower level of earnings at earlier stages of their careers.

Our analytical approach allows us to provide insight first by answering the following questions. Do mothers' employment trajectories align with childless women once the childrearing burden is lessened? Do mothers even compensate for the lost (or reduced) working time during their childbearing years by working more years than childless women, for example working more years before retiring? We extend these questions by taking a gender perspective, i.e. by evaluating whether the number of children relates to men's employment trajectories at midlife and how women and men differ in these respects. Importantly, if differences in employment exist beyond childbearing years, this will have additional impacts on cumulative lifetime income and retirement income level (Kahn et al. 2014; Muller et al. 2020) and thus to extend economic gender disparities in later life.

Second, we contribute to the literature by assessing the role of education in shaping the differences in mid-life employment trajectories of parents and childless individuals. Expected years in employment reflect employment continuity and the accumulation of work experience, which is together with education, a central element of human capital (Becker 2009). Previous research has shown that despite their higher opportunity costs of children, highly educated women end up paying lower motherhood wages and employment penalties (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005; Doren 2019a). Women investing in education also commonly postpone childbearing (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2012) to establish themselves in the labor market before childbearing, and also often tend to have fewer children. These prevent the accumulation of employment disadvantages from early ages and from a larger number of children (Doren 2019b). Still, it remains unanswered whether the long-term impact of parity on employment trajectories in midlife varies by education, and how genders potentially differ in this respect.

Third, we answer these questions by analyzing employment trajectories in three different welfare state contexts: Finland, Italy, and the U.S. These countries differ in their institutional and cultural settings, which affect the opportunities and conditions especially for mothers' employment. Recent studies suggest that, although family and occupational lives have become increasingly complex across birth cohorts, differences across countries are much larger and more relevant for understanding the employment complexity than variation across cohorts (Van Winkle 2020; Van Winkle and Fasang 2017, 2021). Finland is a country with a well-known Nordic egalitarian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; Mills and Blossfeld 2006). Italy is characterized as a familialistic welfare regime with limited public support for families with children (Saraceno 2016; Saraceno and Keck 2010), whereas the U.S. is a liberal social welfare regime with very limited public support overall (Esping-Andersen 1990). In contrast to Italy and the U.S., family policies in Finland guarantee generous family leaves combined with job protection and aim at supporting mothers' labor market participation (Esping-Andersen 2009; Ferrarini 2006; Jalovaara and Fasang 2020). Institutional support for work-family reconciliation generally facilitates mothers' employment, by lowering the risk of job loss or permanently leaving the labor force (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).

We contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how children relate to employment trajectories of women and men in their midlife. Our results show that varying gender gaps in expected employment years by parity persist until retirement in all countries. Among women, those with three or more children are the most disadvantaged in Italy and partly in the U.S., while in Finland, the childless women expect the shortest working lives at midlife. As compared to women, the variation by parity in men is less pronounced while variation between the countries is stronger. In all three countries, the parity-specific gender gap is largest among the low educated. Among the highly educated, the gender gap is pronounced only in Italy. The employment patterns of childless individuals differ the most between the countries. Our approach contributes to a better understanding of how individual characteristics – gender, parity, and education – intersect with the welfare context, and how their

intersection affects women's and men's opportunities in the labor market and perpetuates gender disparities.

## Background

### Employment by gender across three welfare contexts

The extensive literature investigating the relationship between fertility and women's employment has documented a negative relationship between parenthood and various measures of mothers' labor market outcomes (e.g., Aisenbrey and Fasang 2017; Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005; Blau and Kahn 1997; Budig and England 2001; Kahn et al. 2014; Killewald and Zhuo 2019; Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood 2010). The relationship is particularly strong when young children are in the household (Lundberg and Rose 2000). Despite the rich literature, research has less often given attention to the differences in mothers' employment and earnings patterns by parity (e.g., Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2016; Doren 2019; Kahn et al. 2014) or compared mothers with fathers (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2022; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2013).

Mothers' and fathers' employment trajectories are long-term processes that intersect with other individual, and contextual, characteristics. Across advanced economies, mothers remain disproportionately the main and often the only childcare provider. In the years surrounding the birth and within several years postpartum, mothers often interrupt working, and the consequences on mothers' employment and earnings last much longer (Kahn et al. 2014). In some contexts, such as Italy, it is also frequent that mothers leave their jobs altogether (Pacelli, Pasqua, and Villosio 2013; Solera 2009), decrease working hours, or re-enter the labor market in less prestigious and rewarding jobs, all contributing to lowering their chances of career advancement and higher earnings (Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020). Child-related career breaks negatively affect the human capital accumulation and may even lead to its depreciation during work interruptions (Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens 2017). The reduced accumulation of experience, and its effect on earnings, may negatively impact mothers' future employment opportunities and desires, with potentially lasting consequences until retirement and financial well-being at older ages (Muller et al. 2020). Successive births, requiring additional time and effort for childrearing, are likely to diminish employment opportunities only for mothers (Evertsson 2013) and may contribute to the accumulation of disadvantages in the labor market, especially when public policies do not support maternal employment.

On the contrary, fathers usually take very short child-related career breaks (Bruning and Plantenga 1999; Sigle-Rushton et al. 2013). Even in the more egalitarian Nordic countries, mothers take on average substantially longer leaves than fathers (Jalovaara and Fasang 2020). More generally, previous literature provides evidence supporting a fatherhood advantage, in both wage and probability of employment, (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2022; Glauber 2018; Killewald 2013; Kim A. Weeden, Youngjoo Cha, and Mauricio Bucca 2016; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Mari 2019; Weinshenker

2015; Yu and Hara 2021), in particular for married residential fathers compared to childless men and mothers (Killewald 2013). Studies attempting to explain the fathers' advantages over mothers in the labor market focus on three main mechanisms: increased gender-specific specialization after childbirth, employers' preferences (discrimination), and selection. With mothers being the primary caregiver, fathers increase their productivity by identifying themselves as financial providers through greater work commitment. The behavioral changes following entry into fatherhood could even increase chances for promotion without increasing work efforts (Budig and Hodges 2010). Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak (2022) hypothesize that fatherhood advantages may change the labor market position of men with each additional child because of the increased financial pressure and care burden on the family. Discrimination by employers is more commonly experienced by mothers (Budig and England 2001), and practically also women of childbearing age without children may face discrimination due to their potential to become mothers.

Mothers' preferences for family over work (Hakim 2000) or preferences for less demanding jobs, are forms of selection, and are likely important drivers of the differences in employment rates between men and women with and without children. However, selection due to individuals' preferences may account only for part of the differences in the gendered employment rates. For instance, according to Eurostat (2022), in 2020, Finnish and Italian mothers' employment rates were about 80% and 53%, respectively. The corresponding figures for fathers were 92% and 82%. Such large differences between countries cannot be only explained by mothers' preferences, or self-selection out of the labor market, but rather point the importance of the differential welfare state context, especially considering that both Italy and Finland are among the lowest low fertility countries (Billari and Kohler 2004; Hellstrand, Nisén, and Myrskylä 2020). Many possible mechanisms contribute to such differences, from labor market organization to welfare systems' generosity, as well as cultures and norms. Still, these mechanisms are intrinsically related to gender, which is an expression of the social structure shaping the role of men and women in the society (Scott 1986).

As predicted by the life course paradigm, employment trajectories are the product of opportunities and constraints (Elder 1998). Gendered employment trajectories are ineluctably linked to opportunity structures and cultural contexts. Thus, we expect that the employment implications of parenthood also after the core childbearing years can be mitigated or exacerbated by contextual circumstances. Countries with more gender-egalitarian norms and public policies supportive of dual-earner families, like Finland, show higher levels of female employment, particularly among mothers, in comparison to other countries (Budig et al. 2012; Jalovaara and Fasang 2020). In countries with more traditional gender roles, like Italy, the division of work and care is strongly gendered (Anxo et al. 2011; Solera 2009). Mothers are the prime caretakers of the child(ren) and other unpaid work at home (Craig and Mullan 2010). At the same time, men increase their work hours with the increased financial responsibility for the family. The U.S. can be viewed as a universal breadwinner welfare state with very limited government intervention through social policies (Sainsbury 1999). This passive approach may

favor mothers' employment after the childbearing years to compensate for income losses, as evidence suggests that the motherhood gap in employment is eliminated at ages older than 40 (Kahn et al. 2014)

Given the present contexts, there are gender differences in care responsibilities of young children, advantaging fathers, and it is reasonable to expect that such differences will remain or become weaker when the demand for childcare becomes less intensive, but that a gender imbalance in unpaid work in couples may still continue. Working fathers are likely to maintain employment continuity and advance their careers, consolidating their advantages from earlier stages of their careers. A shift in the share of paid work from fathers to mothers seems unlikely unless external circumstances, e.g., health problems of the father, require an increase in the work commitment of the partner.

Therefore, we hypothesize that in Italy there would be large differences between expected employment years between mothers and fathers, especially at higher parities. Conversely, when the welfare state supports mothers' labor market attachment, and when couples share childcare and housework more equally, as in Finland, women would have more opportunities to invest in their careers. Thus, the midlife trajectories are expected to be more similar between men and women, irrespective of parities, in Finland than in Italy. For the U.S., the lack of institutional support for families with children, combined with less gender traditional norms than in Italy, hints at potentially small gender differences by parity in employment trajectories: women need to work. For Finland and the U.S., we expect to observe differences in employment by gender at higher parities, if any, for which additive negative effects of motherhood may cumulate and selection from supply side, mothers' preferences for family over work, may also play a role.

Our approach, based on a demographic account, complements existing studies by relating how many years in employment are expected between ages 40-74, for men and women, childless and with children. We focus on unconditional measures, that is, population-level expectancies. Such measures provide a more nuanced but fuller picture of employment trajectories of men and women, allowing us to better evaluate how employment is related to the number of children at midlife when the childrearing commitments are likely to be less intensive. We do not attempt, however, to identify the causal effects of the number of children on mothers' and fathers' employment trajectories at midlife

#### The intersection of gender, fertility, and education across contexts

The increasing level of education among women is one of the most important determinants of women's growing labor force participation (Goldin and Katz 2018). Many studies focusing on the U.S. show that the employment rate is higher among the most educated women. In the U.S., college-educated women not only participate in growing numbers, but are more often employed full-time than lower-educated women, and also tend to have longer working lives altogether (Dudel and Myrskylä 2017). On the contrary, among the least-educated, women have notably shorter working lives than men (Dudel and Myrskylä 2017), and the gender gaps in employment and earnings increase with age (OECD 2017). Research focusing on European countries shows similar findings, although evidence is more



heterogeneous. The gender gap in employment is generally small in the Nordic countries, irrespective of educational level – in fact in Finland the gap is reversed at ages close to retirement (Leinonen, Martikainen, and Myrskylä 2018) – while it is relatively large in Italy, especially among the low-educated (OECD 2017).

From an economic perspective, the opportunity-costs (price-effect) principle suggests higher employment rates for highly educated mothers. The cost of staying at home caring for children instead of working is higher for highly educated mothers than for less educated, as the potential earnings are greater for the former. The income effect principle, puts forward the opposite expectations: mothers need to work less for pay as long as there are income sources other than their own in the household. However, abundant evidence shows that better-educated mothers are more likely to be employed, suggesting that the opportunity-cost effect is prevalent, especially in the long term (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005; Kahn et al. 2014). Sociological theories, which see motherhood as socially constructed, also emphasize non-monetary aspects of motherhood. In particular, jobs enhancing personal growth, identity, and social rewards motivate mothers to work for pay (Gerson 1986). Because such jobs are more accessible to highly educated women, also this perspective suggests higher employment rates for highly educated mothers than for less educated.

Highly educated individuals have a larger set of alternatives and resources (Hout 2012), more job options, and thus more opportunities to find flexible, family-friendly, and well-paid occupations (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005), and therefore also more means to afford childcare and domestic work (Gonalons-Pons 2015). Such jobs also warrant more autonomy, resulting in less job strain, work-family conflict, and potentially helping to mitigate the motherhood penalty (Yu and Kuo 2017). All those factors arguably allow mothers to reconcile family and work-life; the importance of such means increases with the number of children, as each additional child is estimated to decrease the mothers' probability of working between 10 and 20 percent (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2016).

High education may favour mothers' career development through prestigious jobs and benefits, but then again high education may disfavor mothers' careers as the dedication required for prestigious jobs may be difficult to realize for mothers of small children. Complementary, evidence suggests that highly educated individuals hold more demanding jobs requiring extra work hours or taking work home. Similarly, employers may refuse to grant highly educated women flexibility or career advancement, believing mothers cannot fully commit to their careers (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Given the tendency for socioeconomic homogamy (Mäenpää 2015), it is also relevant to note that highly educated women may also decide to remain at home to care for children when the husband is also highly educated, pursuing a specialization within the couple that favours the husband's career (Becker 1985).

Despite the important contribution of increased education among women in reducing the gender gap in employment, it is unclear how education intersects with gender and parity in the contemporary labour markets (Gough and Noonan 2013; Wilde et al. 2010). For mothers, more children translate in increased expenses and financial needs, more family related responsibilities, and fewer opportunities for

professional development. However, such negative consequences can be mitigated by a more equal division of responsibilities at home, which seems to be the reality more often among highly educated couples (Sullivan, Billari, and Altintas 2014). Nowadays, women are increasingly more educated than men (OECD 2021), and fathers are increasingly involved in childcare (Hobson and Fahlén 2009). Highly educated individuals can be considered forerunners of change in gender equality, that is, highly educated lead the way of the gender revolution (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015), sharing household responsibilities and childrearing duties more equally, also in the very low fertility countries (Sullivan et al. 2014). Recent studies show that the likelihood of being employed tends to increase with the number of small children among fathers (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2022), but evidence of the intersecting role of education with parity on employment at ages from midlife to retirement of both mothers and fathers is missing.

Both cultural attitudes and policies are at play in the interaction leading to differential levels of gender inequality (Budig et al. 2012) in aspects such as employment disadvantage of mothers as compared to fathers. The socio-political and cultural context of the Nordic countries is advanced in gender equality. In 2015, in Finland the gender gap in the employment rate among highly educated and aged 25-54, with at least one child younger than 15, was about 13 percentage points, while in Italy and the U.S. the corresponding figures were 18 and 19 percentage points (OECD 2017). In the three countries the corresponding gap among the least educated is 32, 43, and 41 percentage points, respectively. Such evidence combined with the discussed theoretical and contextual differences motivate the following hypotheses. In Finland, we expect small gender differences in employment among the highly educated regardless of parity. High education also mitigates the employment gap between mothers and fathers in Italy and the U.S., but to a lesser extent than in Finland, and the employment gap may persist at higher parities. Among the least educated we expect moderate differences in Finland, larger than those observed for their highly educated counterparts, and a larger employment gap at higher parities. For Italy, we expect a large gender gap in employment among the least educated that increases with parity. For the U.S., we expect that among the low educated the gender gap in employment is halfway to the gaps observed in Finland and Italy, and the relationship is pronounced at higher parities.

## Data and Methods

Our main data sets are representative samples of individuals ages 40 to 74, resident in Finland, Italy, and the U.S., during 2000-2017, 2000-2014, 1999-2019, respectively. For Finland, we use a 20 percent random sample of the whole population permanently resident in the country, based on Statistics Finland's register data<sup>2</sup>; measurements used in the analyses are annual. For Italy, the data come from

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<sup>2</sup> license nr. TK-53-1119-17

the **S**urvey on **H**ousehold, **I**ncome and **W**ealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy. The SHIW is a nationally representative survey of the Italian population conducted biennially; each wave includes about 8,000 households (20,000 individuals). For the U.S., our data come from the **P**anel **S**tudy on **I**ncome **D**ynamics (PSID). PSID is nationally representative and has been conducted annually through 1997 and biennially thereafter. The study is produced and distributed by the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan; as of 2019, more than 9500 families are followed.

### Outcome

The outcome is an indicator of the individual labor force status, with four mutually exclusive categories; three categories denote the transient states, employed, inactive (including unemployed), and retired; the fourth category indicates the absorbing state, that is, whether the individual is alive. For the Finnish data, we obtain the corresponding statuses referring to the main activity in the last week of the year and aggregating individuals unemployed, inactive, and enrolled in education in the inactive category. For the SHIW and the PSID, we construct this variable through the corresponding self-reported labor force status at each wave. In the category employed, we included only individuals working at each of the corresponding waves; the inactive category groups individuals of the self-reported categories: unemployed, inactive, student, permanently disabled, housekeeper, and others; the retired category consists only of retired individuals.

### Covariates

In all the model specifications, we control for age, gender, marital status, the highest educational attainment, and the number of children. All the data sources provide the year of death for those individuals who die during the study period. Marital status distinguishes between married, divorced, single, and widowed individuals. For Finland and Italy, education is categorized into three levels: low, mid, and high, although there are some minor differences in the categories between countries. In the case of Finland, the low-educated are individuals with only compulsory education (lower secondary diploma), the mid-educated are individuals with upper secondary diplomas and the high-educated are individuals with higher than secondary school diplomas, e.g., Bachelor's degree. For Italy, the low-educated are individuals with at most primary education, the mid-educated are individuals with at most high schools diploma, and the high-educated are individuals with at least a three years university degree. For the U.S., educational attainment is categorized as less than high school, high school diploma, general equivalency degree (GED), Associate and Vocational degree, and some college and higher. In the PSID, direct information on the total number of children born to an individual is provided. In the SHIW data, we obtain the number of children born to an individual summing up children residing in the household with the number of children who left the household. For the Finnish sample, we reconstruct the number of children based on records on children ever registered to the person, and the marital status from annual records on the civil status of the person in the last week of the year.

We add context-specific controls: race/ethnicity in the U.S. and area of residence, in the case of Italy, because such information is very relevant for correctly capturing differences in both the labor market and fertility profiles of individuals. In the U.S. case, we distinguish between non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and other (for simplicity, White, Black, Hispanic, and other); the other category includes individuals of all the remaining race/ethnicity. For Italy, we consider the area of residence as three macro-regions: North, Centre, and South. Coherently, for Finland, we control if individuals are native-born or not.

## Methods

To estimate the employment trajectories and the number of expected years in Employment, Inactivity, and Retirement from ages 40 to 74, by gender, parity, and education, we use a multistate approach (Dudel and Myrskylä 2017; Hoem 1977). The multistate approach extends classical event history analysis, as individuals can move back and forth between several competing states. The movement depends on the probabilities of transitioning from one state to another, e.g., the probability of moving from employment to retirement.

Individuals move between the labor force states (employment, inactivity, retirement) and eventually die; individuals who turn 76 years old are censored; in the case of Finland, individuals are censored at age 75 as the data allows for estimating single-year transitions. Labor market states are ‘transient’ as individuals move across them. While death is an “absorbing” state, meaning that the state cannot be left. The set of all states is the “state space”. In our model, the state space covers aging by combining age 40 to age 74 with each of the transient states: e.g., ‘aged 68 and employed’, ‘aged 69 retired.’

Movements across states are modelled through transition probabilities that we estimate through discrete-time event history models using multinomial logistic regressions (Allison 1982). The state at time  $t+1$  is a function of the state at time  $t$ , and of additional variables; in the main specification, we control for age, education, marital status, and the number of children. Additionally, we include country-specific covariates, that is, area of residence in the case of Italy and race/ethnicity in the U.S, and nativity in Finland. Age is modelled as a cubic restricted spline (Yee and Wild 1996). Education is interacted with number of children to account for the potential heterogeneity in employment trajectories by education across parities. We stratify the sample by gender, implicitly interacting gender with all the variables included in the linear predictor. We predict from the models the transition probabilities, which are the basic quantities for obtaining the expectancies. The prediction of transition probabilities for population level estimates are obtained setting categorical variables to their sample proportion (e.g., proportion of married, divorced, single, widowed, by parity); the same categorical indicator(s) are set equal to 1 for computing group-specific estimates. For Italy, we match the obtained transition probabilities with the corresponding survival probabilities of the 2008 period life tables published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), using an approach based on Dudel & Myrskylä (2017). Matched transition probabilities facilitate population comparisons and reduce the impact of inaccuracies in the mortality

follow-up on the overall survival. The matching algorithm does not modify the estimated status expectancies, that is employment, inactivity and retirement expectancy. The transition probabilities are organized in a matrix form separately for gender, education, and parity. The obtained matrices are then transformed into the format of the fundamental matrix (Kemeny and Snell 1983; Taylor and Karlin 1998), from which we compute all the quantities of interests. We compute nonparametric 95% empirical bootstrap confidence intervals (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) based on 1000 replications of the estimation procedure. The implemented resampling procedure preserves the longitudinal structure of the data sets.

## Results

### Descriptive results

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the three analytical samples. The Finnish sample consists of more than 8,5 million person-years. The gender composition is balanced, with 53% of individuals being women, and about 60% married. Among the highly educated, 55% are women, while the lower educational categories do not show a prevalent gender difference. In the analytical sample for Italy there are 42 thousand person-waves (the SHIW panel and the PSID are biannual). Of those, 53 % are women and about 80% are married. For Italy the gender composition of highly educated is reversed compared to Finland, i.e. the share of highly educated is slightly larger among men than women. The U.S. analytical sample includes 64 thousand person-waves. In the case of the U.S., gender is evenly distributed, women comprise 52% of the sample. More than 70 percent of the individuals are married, and women are slightly overrepresented at all educational levels apart from bachelor degree and higher. As compared to Finland and the U.S., Italy is also characterized by a lower overall level of education: nine out of ten have at most a high school degree.

### Expected years in employment at age 40 by gender and number of children in Finland, Italy and the U.S.

Years of life expected in employment, in inactivity and in retirement sum up to the residual life expectancy (LE) between age 40 to 74, that is the total lifetime individuals expect to live from age 40 to age 74. The results summarize what the expected years in employment would be if the prevalent mortality and labor force conditions of the period under study were applied to a synthetic cohort of individuals aged 40 to 74. Complete tables including results for expected years of inactivity, retirement and total life expectancy are provided in the appendix.

Figure 1 shows the expected years in employment by gender, parity and country. For Finland, the expected number of years in employment at age 40 by parity show a pattern of comparatively small gender differences. The most striking differences are observed between parities: the number of years in employment is higher among those at higher parities, up to parity two. Childless individuals have the

shortest working lives among women and men. Childless women expect to work for about 15.5 years, and childless men only for about 13.5 years. Mothers of two children and fathers of two or more children have the longest expected working life, about 18.3 years. Mothers of three and more children expect about one-year shorter working lives than mothers of two children, while the difference between fathers of two and fathers of three or more children is negligible.

Table 1 - Sample size by individual characteristics (in percentages) – Finland 2000-2017, Italy 1998-2016, the U.S. 1999-2019


		Finland		Italy		U.S.	
		Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
N		4,364,377	4,190,824	22,059	19,733	34,534	29,416
Number of children							
	0	16.1	22.1	13.4	14.3	10.8	14.2
	1	18.1	16.5	19.3	19.4	14.4	14.8
	2	37.0	34.4	41.1	42.5	34.5	34.2
	3+	28.8	27.0	26.2	23.7	40.4	36.7
Education							
	Less than high secondary school diploma	30.0	32.3	33.0	23.2	12.1	12.4
	High secondary school diploma	36.6	39.0	57.7	66.6	35.2	34.6
	Ged/Vocational/Associate					24.8	21.1
	Bachelor +	33.5	28.7	9.3	10.1	28.0	31.8
Marital status							
	Married	57.7	61.4	75.7	84.6	65.2	81.0
	Single	15.1	20.7	7.3	8.7	9.5	5.5
	Divorced	18.9	15.7	5.6	4.1	19.4	11.6
	Widowed	8.3	2.1	11.4	2.6	5.9	1.9
Country of birth							
	Other country	3.3	3.4				
	Finland	96.7	96.6				
Area							
	North			43.2	43.4		
	Centre			20.6	20.5		
	South			36.3	36.1		
Race/Ethnicity							
	White					56.7	63.6
	Black					33.8	26.0
	Hispanics					6.5	7.0
	other					2.9	3.4

The difference between childless individuals and parents in the Finnish context suggests that a large part of childlessness may be driven by poor early labor market attachment or processes selecting individuals

both out of the labor market and to remain childless, thus pointing to a socio-economic disadvantaged group; the very high childlessness in Table 1 supports such perspective.

In contrast to Finland, the results for Italy show a strongly gendered relationship between expected years in employment and parity. Among Italian women, the expected number of years in employment is lower among those with a larger number of children. Among Italian men, fathers are advantaged in their employment trajectories as compared to childless men, but there are small differences between fathers of different parities.

Figure 1- Years expected in employment at ages 40-74, by gender and parity - Finland 2000-2017, Italy 2000-2014, the U.S. 1999-2019



Note: given the large sample size of the Finnish register data, in the figure confidence intervals are nearly indiscernible. Complete tables with confidence interval are provided in the appendix.

Strikingly different as compared to Finland, childless women in Italy spend more years in employment, (13.9 years), than mothers, and the gap between these groups is larger the more children the mother has. Mothers with three or more children are expected to work 5.9 years less than childless women. This means that at age 40 the working life of mothers with three or more children is expected to be only about 40 percent of the residual working life of childless women. In men, the main difference is between fathers and childless individuals, with the latter expected to work about 16.6 years, about 3 years less than fathers. Among fathers, the expected number of remaining employment years at age 40 is about 20, with no clear pattern according to the number of children. It is worth to notice the remarkable gender gap in Italy: despite their shorter working lives as compared to fathers, childless men are still expected to work longer than women of any parity.

Unlike in Finland and especially Italy, in the U.S. the expected length of the working life is very similar across parities zero to two for mothers, and the gender differences in expected employment emerge only at parities two and higher. What stands out is the difference in expected employment of


mothers of three and more children as compared to those with fewer or no children. A gap of about 2 years in the residual working life at age 40 should be considered as an additional disadvantage in the labor market that mothers, but also fathers, accumulate during their working lives, considering that the work interruptions increase with the number of children.

The comparison between Finland, Italy, and the U.S. shows differences in the level, as expected (Americans and Finns have longer working lives, on average, than Italians). Notably, the employment patterns by gender and parity are very different in the three countries, suggesting, as hypothesized, the important role of institutional and cultural factors in shaping how fertility and gender intersect in producing heterogeneity in employment trajectories.

### Expected years in employment at age 40, by gender, education and number of children in Finland, Italy and the U.S.

Education plays a prominent role for levels of employment overall: the less educated individuals can expect to spend fewer years of their lives in employment than their more highly educated counterparts, irrespectively of country, gender and parity. Nevertheless, within levels of education, differences across parities and gender are noteworthy.

Figure 2 - Years expected in employment at ages 40-74, by gender, parity and education - Finland 2000-2017



Note: given the large sample size of the Finnish register data, in the figure confidence intervals are nearly indiscernible. Complete tables with confidence intervals are provided in the appendix.

Figure 2 shows the results for Finland. Across educational levels, the largest difference is found between those who have less than secondary education and those who have tertiary education. In general, the results on Finland are characterized by gender similarity, although some gender gaps are




present among the less educated groups. At all educational levels, childless individuals expect the shortest working lives, irrespective of gender. Among childless individuals, the most educated expected to work almost twice the years of the least educated. Irrespective of gender, the least educated childless at age 40 expect less than 12 years in employment while their highly educated counterparts expect about 17.6 (men) and 18.5 (women) years in employment, respectively.

Within levels of education, there is a degree of variation in the parity-specific employment pattern. While for the highly educated the expected years in employment increase modestly with the number of children, for individuals with secondary education the longest working lives are expected at parity two and three or higher. Mothers (fathers) of two children expect to work about 18.2 (17.8) years at age 40, if they have a secondary school diploma, while about 15.1 (16.4) years if they do not have a secondary school diploma. Importantly, in the case of men, the number of children seems to play a role as important as education: least educated fathers of two children expect to work 16.4 years, the same as fathers of single child (16.2) with secondary school diploma.

Figure 3 shows the expected years in employment by gender, education and parity in Italy. Gender differences are strikingly large especially among those with less than tertiary-level education. Across educational groups, fathers have a higher expected number of years in employment than childless. In women, those with three or more children have the shortest expectancy of working life in all educational groups. Gender differences are significantly larger among the less educated groups, and the parity-specific gender differences are largest at the highest parities (3+). The largest gap is observed comparing highly educated fathers of two children with low educated mothers with three and more children, about 20 years.


Figure 3 - Years expected in employment at ages 40-74, by gender, parity and education - Italy 1998-



Across educational levels, childless men have shorter remaining working lives than other men at age 40. The gap between childless men and fathers is about 3 years, irrespective of education. The situation is different in the case of women as the gap between childless and mothers increases with education; among the highly educated, childless women expect to work 4 years longer than mothers. The number of expected years for the least educated women ranges from about 4 years, among mothers with three and more children to 6 years among childless women. Despite the overall strikingly low level of employment observed among the least educated mothers, there is a clear negative gradient by parity. In turn, it is notable how the gender differences in employment are relatively small among the most educated men and women, and the expected years in employment is not that different from those observed for the Finnish and American counterparts. In Italy, the most educated fathers expect to work about 22 to 25 years, while the most educated women, childless and mothers with at most two children expect to work no less than 20 years. Mothers of three children or more expect about 17 years of employment, 7 years less of the male counterparts, and between 3 to 4 years compared to other highly educated women.

Figure 4 shows the results for different educational groups in the U.S. Gender differences in employment years at age 40 are fairly large among the least educated, while in the more highly educated groups there are moderate gender differences only at parities two and three or higher. Overall, parity-specific gender gaps in employment are much smaller than in the case of Italy, but more pronounced than in the fairly gender-neutral case of Finland.

Figure 4 - Years expected in employment at ages 40-74, by gender, parity and education - the U.S 1999-2019



Least educated mothers of three or more children expect to work about 10.6 years, a 6 years gap with their male counterpart; a similar gap is found at parity two. At higher level of education, the number of expected years for mothers and fathers at parities two and three or more grows of considerably, and the gap reduces to 2 – 3 years, at most. Irrespective of gender, childless individuals show modest differences in the expected years of employment, compared to parents. Among childless individuals, the largest gender difference is found among the least educated, with women working about 8 years and men about 11 years. Among women, the largest gap, about 14 years, is between least educated childless women and most educated mothers with three or more children. Among men, within the positive education educational pattern, employment years increase with parity. In fact, childless individuals consistently expect fewer employment years compared to fathers, irrespective of the number of children. More generally, within and between levels of education we observe pattern of employment that are not as gendered as in Italy, and more similar to that observed for Finland, with the least educated childless individuals expecting the least number of years in employment, but the differences with parents are small.

### Robustness checks

As the multistate life tables are based on a period approach, we conduct additional analyses to confirm that our results are not driven by the life experiences of the oldest individuals in the samples.

Table 2 – Employment expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by gender and number of children – Finland, 2000-2017 - Italy, 1998-2016 – the U.S. 1999-2019

	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
		Women			Men		
Finland	childless	8.0	8.3	8.7	6.7	7.0	7.3
	1	8.6	8.9	9.2	8.3	8.6	8.9
	2	9.5	9.7	9.9	9.3	9.6	9.8
	3+	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.6	9.8	10.0
Italy	childless	5.1	6.0	6.9	7.4	8.2	9.0
	1	5.0	5.6	6.1	8.5	9.2	9.9
	2	4.7	5.1	5.4	8.8	9.2	9.6
	3+	2.9	3.3	3.7	8.2	8.8	9.3
U.S.	childless	10.3	11.2	12.0	10.3	11.1	11.9
	1	10.6	11.3	12.0	11.7	12.5	13.3
	2	10.7	11.2	11.7	12.7	13.2	13.8
	3+	9.4	9.8	10.3	11.8	12.3	12.8

Therefore, we analyzed two sets of the analytical samples restricted to the ages 50 – 74<sup>3</sup>. The expected years of employment at ages 40-50 are about the difference between the estimates for the full age range 40-74 and those at ages 50-74. We estimate employment years on the samples restricted to ages 50-74 (and 60-74) to ensure that the results in the full samples including ages 40-74 are not driven by older or younger cohorts; the sample restriction also reduce the potential variation in the extent to which young children are present at home across groups. In the three considered countries, the results show patterns very similar to those referring to ages 40-74 (Table 2). This implies that the disadvantage observed at higher parities for mothers in Italy and in the U.S., is not likely to depend on the older cohorts and it is highly unlikely that at age 50 and older employment is affected by the presence of small children in the household. For Finland, the observed pattern in the sample restricted to ages 50-74 shows no differences with the pattern observed in the sample including ages 40-74.

## Discussion

Do mothers' employment trajectories align with those of fathers once the childrearing burden is lessened? Does the length of working life vary by parity in midlife? This work examined the employment trajectories of individuals aged 40 to 74 in three different welfare state contexts – Finland, Italy and the U.S. We compared the expected number of years in employment of women and men with a different number of children, and provided novel evidence of the variation in employment trajectories in midlife across parities and genders across welfare state contexts.

<sup>3</sup> We considered a further restriction to ages 60 – 74 obtaining, as expected, very small residual expectancies and thus not included but available upon request.

We show the gendered differences in parity-specific employment trajectories, which confirm the persistence of the labor market disadvantage women suffer at older ages when the overwhelming majority of women have completed fertility and the childcare burden is very likely lower than at younger ages. The extent of the disadvantage, however, depends strongly on the country in question. Education plays a larger role in the employment trajectories of women than men. In the three countries analyzed, highly educated women show smaller differences in expected years of employment as compared to men, irrespective of their parity. Among women, differences in employment years by parity are larger among the least educated in all countries. This advantage of highly educated women as compared to less educated women, irrespective of parity, is consistent across countries.

Our results for Finland complement and resonate with previous findings on earnings premium for mothers and fathers (Jalovaara and Fasang 2020). We found that fathers and mothers of two and more children have the longest working lives between ages 40 and retirement. As in the Finnish sample 60 percent are married individuals, we believe that fathers and mothers with the longest working lives are individuals who follow the most normative family lives of stable marriage and parenthood, as in Jalovaara and Fasang (2020). Among the groups of individuals with three and more children, fathers work longer than mothers suggesting that men benefit more from the traditional family life course. Our results for childless individuals align with the previous notions that in Finland childless men and women do not have a particularly strong labor market attachment (Miettinen and Jalovaara 2020; Nisén et al. 2018). Rather, as we show here, they have the shortest working lives in midlife. Additional results available in the appendix consolidate this interpretation by showing that childless individuals expect more years both in inactivity and in retirement.

For Italy we found striking gender differences and opposite parity-specific patterns of employment. In women, employment years decrease with parity, while in men, fathers have longer working lives in midlife than childless men. Despite their shorter working lives compared to fathers, childless men still expect to work longer than women, irrespective of women's parity. In the case of Italy, we believe that our results reflect the traditional separation of gender roles in the family, that in the analyzed cohorts are still dominant, indicated by the high prevalence of marriage (80% in the sample were married). The results are consistent with previous research on the length of working life (Lorenti, Dudel, and Myrskylä 2019) and the motherhood penalty in Italy (Casarico and Lattanzio 2021). Additional results (available in the appendix) show that childless men expect more time in inactivity and in retirement as compared to fathers. Childless women, in turn, expect the least number of years in inactivity and the longest in retirement. Such findings for childless women have important implications. In fact, the longest expectancy in both employment and retirement implies an earlier transition to retirement, as the age interval considered is 40–74 for all individuals. As a consequence, the number of years that mothers spend inactive increases with parity. It is plausible that some mothers with more children were not able to accumulate enough pension contributions because of career breaks and they need to stay longer in the labor market until being able to claim a pension and retire.

For the U.S., our results show small gender differences in the working lives of men and women; differences are noticeable only in the case of mothers and fathers of three and more children, who expect the least number of years in employment. Overall, consistently with previous literature on earning penalties and premiums (Kahn et al. 2014; Killewald 2013; Killewald and Zhuo 2019) our findings suggest that motherhood employment penalty (and fatherhood premium) at age 40 and above are little. The motherhood employment penalty by parity attenuates with age, but persist for mothers and fathers who have two or more children. Mothers and fathers with three and more children expect also the highest number of years in inactivity whereas the least number of years in retirement (in the case of mothers) pointing to a potential need for staying longer in the labor market, but with a limited ability to remain continuously employed.

Our study provides further evidence for a large degree of variation in the employment patterns by gender and parity across countries (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 2016; Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Muller et al. 2020). We highlight that such variation is present also during midlife, beyond the core childbearing years. The differences between countries emphasize the influence of institutional and cultural factors in shaping employment patterns of women and men depending on their number of children. The case of Finland and U.S. also illustrates that very different institutional settings may bring about similarly small gender gaps in overall employment levels.

Although some of the estimated differences in expected years in employment may appear small, the results should be considered as additional (dis)advantages that (wo)men accumulate in the labor market from age 40 onward, beyond the (dis)advantages accumulated up to that age. Moreover, it is worth to highlight while other research has mainly focused on examining employed individuals and the wage gaps due to childbearing, our estimates are obtained exploiting the entire labor market experiences of the whole population, as such, even differences that appear small contribute significantly to outcomes at aggregate level. To put the results in perspective, it is also worth to remind that in the last two decades, major reforms were enacted to increase, often by a few months, retirement age, to guarantee pension systems' sustainability. We argue that investing in women's employment, especially in mothers' employment, should be at the top of policy makers agenda, given the expected positive repercussions at individual and societal level, in particular for gender equality and financial sustainability of welfare systems.

Our study provides a summary measure of the disadvantage (advantage) that women (men), and mothers (fathers) experience in the labor market from their early 40s until retirement age. The long-term perspective allows us to study the employment trajectories of mothers and fathers when the childbearing burden is likely reduced. The simplicity of our measure is not without limitations. We cannot evaluate how the employment trajectories of mothers and fathers unfold from the first transition to parenthood onward. Ideally, future research may explore the complete employment patterns from entry into the labor market until retirement and evaluate the impact of different parities on the full employment trajectories. We cannot make causal conclusions either, as we do not exclude the possibility that our

estimates are affected by selection. For instance, some individuals, like mothers of three or more children, may have a stable preference for family over work that affects their fertility and long-term employment trajectories. Indeed, we cannot, and we don't attribute the observed differences in employment to parities. Nonetheless, gender and parity differences exist and must be quantified to better understand the relationship between employment and fertility and target any policy intervention. Moreover, our findings on three different welfare systems show that the employment pattern of childless individuals and parents are context-dependent. For instance, if mothers of three and more children prefer family over work in Italy, that is less the case in the U.S. and not the case in Finland. Education has a substantive role in differentiating the labor market attachment of individuals and, as such, is a characteristic of fundamental importance that provides a benchmark on how strong it should be, an unobserved characteristic to bias hopelessly our estimates.

From a broader perspective, our results resonate with previous findings. The expected number of years in employment is a straightforward indicator, easy to interpret, that allows the comparison of three countries with very different welfare states and cultures. As such, the synthetic measure of employment years has the potential to contribute to a better understanding and identification of the groups at higher risks of marginalization in the labor market. We believe our results are informative for public policies aimed at reducing inequalities in the labor market, particularly those targeting equality between mothers and fathers.

We are aware that in each investigated country large differences in employment trajectories exist across population strata; for instance, between race/ethnic groups in the U.S. or across the macro-areas in Italy. However, we focus on a broad perspective. Our estimates can be considered a primary step toward better understanding of the relationship between population processes and labor market outcomes. Future work can further contribute to a better understanding of the intersection between labor market and demographic process. Indeed, new forms of union are becoming increasingly relevant in many countries. Cohabitation as opposed to marriage, later marriage, and union instability generally may increase the incentives for women to participate in the labor market, but changing family dynamics may also change the constraints for their participation.

Our study highlights the importance of cross-national comparative perspective to understand better the complex interplay between gender, employment and parenthood. We underline the importance of the welfare state context for individual life courses by revealing differences and similarities in the ways that employment trajectories from midlife up until retirement ages depend on gender, fertility and education in Finland, Italy, and the US. Notably, while in Finland and the U.S. highly educated women close the gap with their corresponding male counterparts, in Italy education intersects strongly with gender and parity: among the highly educated the gender gap is almost halved, at all parities. Thus, the present findings indicate that, despite gender, fertility and education play an important role in shaping the employment trajectories of individuals in midlife, the welfare state context has an even more critical role in shaping these trajectories and thus in equalizing opportunities for women and men.





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# Appendix

Table 3 - Sample size by individual characteristics – Finland 2000-2017 (person-year)

		Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
		4,364,377	4,190,824	8,555,201	51.0	49.0
Number of children	0	703,457	926,455	1,629,912	43.2	56.8
	1	791,290	691,659	1,482,949	53.4	46.6
	2	1,613,704	1,442,064	3,055,768	52.8	47.2
	3+	1,255,926	1,130,646	2,386,572	52.6	47.4
Education	Less than high secondary school diploma	1,307,219	1,352,250	2,659,469	49.2	50.8
	high secondary school diploma	1,595,206	1,636,241	3,231,447	49.4	50.6
	Bachelor +	1,461,952	1,202,333	2,664,285	54.9	45.1
Marital status	Married	2,520,410	2,575,019	5,095,429	49.5	50.5
	Single	658,979	867,072	1,526,051	43.2	56.8
	Divorced	823,516	659,720	1,483,236	55.5	44.5
	Widowed	361,472	89,013	450,485	80.2	19.8
Country of birth	Other country	146,149	140,846	286,995	50.9	49.1
	Finland	4,218,228	4,049,978	8,268,206	51.0	49.0



Table 4 - Sample size by individual characteristics – Italy, 1998-2016 (person-wave)

	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
	22,059	19,733	41,832	52.7	47.3
Number of children					
0	2,948	2,826	5,774	13.4	14.3
1	4,259	3,843	8,102	19.3	19.4
2	9,075	8,413	17,488	41.1	42.5
3+	5,777	4,691	10,468	26.2	23.7
Education					
Less than high secondary school diploma	7,290	4,597	11,887	33.0	23.2
high secondary school diploma	12,720	13,177	25,897	57.7	66.6
Bachelor +	2,049	1,999	4,048	28.7	9.3
Marital status					
Married	16,701	16,734	33,435	75.7	84.6
Single	1,609	1,717	3,326	7.3	8.7
Divorced	1,228	816	2,044	5.6	4.1
Widowed	2,521	506	3,027	11.4	2.6
Area					
North	9,525	8,583	18,108	43.2	43.4
Centre	4,534	4,059	8,593	20.6	20.5
South	8,000	7,131	15,131	36.3	36.1

Table 5 - Sample size by individual characteristics – the U.S. 1999-2019 (person-wave)

	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
	34,534	29,416	63,950	54.0	46.0
Number of children					
0	3,716	4,184	7,900	47.0	53.0
1	4,975	4,366	9,341	53.3	46.7
2	11,902	10,056	21,958	54.2	45.8
3+	13,941	10,810	24,751	56.3	43.7
Education					
Less than high secondary school diploma	4,178	3,653	7,831	53.4	46.6
high secondary school diploma	12,141	10,185	22,326	54.4	45.6
Ged/Vocational/ Associate	8,551	6,220	14,771	57.9	42.1
Bachelor +	9,664	9,358	19,022	50.8	49.2
Marital status					
Married	22,533	23,837	46,370	48.6	51.4
Single	3,269	1,623	4,892	66.8	33.2
Divorced	6,708	3,406	10,114	66.3	33.7
Widowed	2,024	550	2,574	78.6	21.4
Race/Ethnicity					
White	19,598	18,712	38,310	51.2	48.8
Black	11,678	7,660	19,338	60.4	39.6
Hispanics	2,259	2,048	4,307	52.4	47.6
other	999	996	1,995	50.1	49.9

Table 6 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Finland, 2000-17

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	15.4	15.5	15.6
	1	16.9	16.9	17.0
	2	18.2	18.3	18.3
	3+	17.3	17.4	17.4
Inactivity	childless	4.4	4.5	4.5
	1	4.0	4.0	4.1
	2	2.9	3.0	3.0
	3+	3.8	3.9	3.9
Retirement	childless	12.3	12.4	12.4
	1	11.9	12.0	12.0
	2	11.9	11.9	11.9
	3+	11.9	11.9	12.0
Life Expectancy	childless	32.3	32.4	32.4
	1	32.9	32.9	33.0
	2	33.2	33.2	33.2
	3+	33.2	33.2	33.2

Table 7 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Finland, 2000-17

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	13.4	13.5	13.6
	1	16.5	16.6	16.6
	2	18.3	18.3	18.4
	3+	18.4	18.4	18.5
Inactivity	childless	5.4	5.4	5.5
	1	3.8	3.8	3.9
	2	2.6	2.7	2.7
	3+	2.7	2.8	2.8
Retirement	childless	11.4	11.4	11.5
	1	11.1	11.1	11.2
	2	11.1	11.1	11.1
	3+	11.0	11.0	11.1
Life Expectancy	childless	30.1	30.2	30.2
	1	31.4	31.5	31.5
	2	32.1	32.1	32.1
	3+	32.1	32.1	32.1

Table 8 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	12.6	13.9	15.1
	1	11.9	12.8	13.7
	2	10.9	11.6	12.3
	3+	7.1	8.0	8.9
Inactivity	childless	4.9	5.8	6.8
	1	7.3	8.2	9.0
	2	10.1	10.9	11.8
	3+	13.9	15.0	16.0
Retirement	childless	11.5	12.3	13.2
	1	10.3	11.0	11.6
	2	8.5	9.1	9.8
	3+	8.2	8.8	9.4
Life Expectancy	childless	31.9	32.0	32.2
	1	31.8	31.9	32.0
	2	31.6	31.7	31.8
	3+	31.7	31.8	31.9

Table 9 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	15.6	16.6	17.5
	1	19.0	19.8	20.6
	2	18.6	19.2	19.8
	3+	17.6	18.4	19.2
Inactivity	childless	2.5	3.1	3.7
	1	0.5	0.9	1.2
	2	0.9	1.2	1.6
	3+	1.4	1.9	2.4
Retirement	childless	10.1	11.0	12.0
	1	9.5	10.3	11.0
	2	10.1	10.6	11.1
	3+	9.7	10.3	10.8
Life Expectancy	childless	29.9	30.7	31.4
	1	30.5	30.9	31.4
	2	30.8	31.0	31.2
	3+	30.3	30.6	30.9

Table 10 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	17.9	18.8	19.8
	1	18.2	19.1	19.9
	2	18.5	19.0	19.5
	3+	16.4	16.9	17.4
Inactivity	childless	4.4	5.1	5.7
	1	5.0	5.6	6.1
	2	5.7	6.0	6.4
	3+	8.3	8.8	9.2
Retirement	childless	6.9	7.8	8.6
	1	7.3	8.0	8.7
	2	7.4	7.8	8.3
	3+	6.2	6.6	6.9
Life Expectancy	childless	30.7	31.6	32.6
	1	32.0	32.7	33.4
	2	32.4	32.8	33.3
	3+	31.8	32.2	32.6

Table 11 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	17.9	18.8	19.7
	1	20.0	20.8	21.7
	2	21.6	22.2	22.8
	3+	20.3	20.9	21.5
Inactivity	childless	3.7	4.1	4.6
	1	2.8	3.2	3.7
	2	2.0	2.2	2.4
	3+	3.0	3.3	3.6
Retirement	childless	6.5	7.3	8.0
	1	6.0	6.7	7.5
	2	7.0	7.4	7.9
	3+	6.6	7.0	7.5
Life Expectancy	childless	29.3	30.2	31.1
	1	29.9	30.8	31.7
	2	31.4	31.8	32.3
	3+	30.7	31.2	31.7

Table 12 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children – Finland, 2000-2017

Status	Education	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%	
Employment	Less than Secondary	Childless	11.3	11.5	11.7	
		1	13.9	14.1	14.3	
		2	15.0	15.1	15.2	
		3 +	13.6	13.7	13.9	
		Childless	14.8	15.0	15.1	
		1	16.8	16.9	17.0	
		2	18.1	18.2	18.3	
		3 +	17.8	17.9	18.0	
		Childless	18.3	18.5	18.6	
	Bachelor +	1	19.4	19.5	19.6	
		2	20.4	20.5	20.6	
		3 +	20.7	20.7	20.8	
		Childless	6.6	6.8	7.0	
		Less than Secondary school	1	5.8	5.9	6.1
			2	5.1	5.2	5.3
3 +	6.2		6.4	6.5		
Inactivity	Secondary school	Childless	4.2	4.3	4.4	
		1	3.7	3.8	3.9	
		2	3.0	3.1	3.1	
		3 +	3.5	3.6	3.7	
		0	3.0	3.1	3.2	
		1	2.4	2.5	2.6	
	Bachelor +	2	1.7	1.8	1.8	
		3 +	1.9	1.9	2.0	
		Childless	12.8	12.9	13.1	
	Less than Secondary school	1	12.4	12.5	12.6	
		2	12.4	12.5	12.6	
		3 +	12.5	12.6	12.7	
		0	12.9	13.0	13.1	
	Retirement	Secondary school	1	12.2	12.2	12.3
			2	11.9	11.9	12.0
3 +			11.7	11.7	11.8	
Childless			11.4	11.5	11.6	
Bachelor +			1	11.2	11.3	11.3
			2	11.2	11.3	11.3
		3 +	11.0	11.0	11.1	
Less than Secondary school		Childless	31.2	31.3	31.4	
		1	32.4	32.4	32.5	
		2	32.8	32.8	32.8	
		3 +	32.6	32.7	32.7	
LE		Secondary school	Childless	32.3	32.3	32.4
			1	32.9	32.9	32.9
			2	33.2	33.2	33.2
			3 +	33.2	33.2	33.3
	Childless		33.1	33.1	33.1	
	Bachelor +		1	33.2	33.3	33.3
		2	33.6	33.6	33.7	
		3 +	33.6	33.6	33.6	

Table 13 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children – Finland, 2000-2017

Status	Education	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	Less than Secondary	Childless	10.9	11.0	11.2
		1	14.8	14.9	15.1
		2	16.3	16.4	16.5
	Secondary school	3 +	16.1	16.2	16.3
		Childless	13.3	13.4	13.5
		1	16.1	16.2	16.3
		2	17.7	17.8	17.9
		3 +	18.0	18.1	18.2
		Childless	17.5	17.6	17.8
	Bachelor +	1	19.2	19.4	19.5
		2	20.3	20.4	20.4
		3 +	20.8	20.9	20.9
Inactivity	Less than Secondary school	Childless	6.4	6.5	6.6
		1	4.6	4.7	4.8
		2	3.7	3.8	3.9
	Secondary school	3 +	3.9	4.0	4.1
		Childless	5.1	5.2	5.3
		1	3.8	3.9	4.0
		2	2.9	2.9	3.0
		3 +	2.8	2.9	2.9
		0	3.7	3.8	3.9
	Bachelor +	1	2.4	2.5	2.5
		2	1.8	1.8	1.8
		3 +	1.6	1.6	1.7
Retirement	Less than Secondary school	Childless	11.6	11.7	11.8
		1	11.2	11.3	11.4
		2	11.3	11.4	11.4
	Secondary school	3 +	11.1	11.2	11.3
		0	11.6	11.6	11.7
		1	11.1	11.2	11.2
		2	11.1	11.2	11.2
		3 +	11.0	11.0	11.1
		Childless	10.4	10.5	10.6
	Bachelor +	1	10.5	10.6	10.7
		2	10.7	10.7	10.8
		3 +	10.4	10.5	10.6
LE	Less than Secondary school	Childless	29.2	29.2	29.3
		1	31.0	31.0	31.1
		2	31.6	31.6	31.6
	Secondary school	3 +	31.3	31.4	31.4
		Childless	30.1	30.2	30.2
		1	31.2	31.3	31.3
		2	31.9	31.9	31.9
		3 +	32.0	32.0	32.1
		Childless	31.7	31.8	31.8
	Bachelor +	1	32.4	32.5	32.5
		2	32.8	32.8	32.8
		3 +	32.8	32.9	32.9

Table 14 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children – Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Education	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	Less than Secondary	Childless	3.5	5.8	8.0
		1	4.9	7.0	9.2
		2	5.4	6.7	8.0
		3 +	2.7	3.7	4.7
	Secondary school	Childless	13.1	14.5	15.9
		1	12.4	13.2	14.1
		2	11.5	12.3	13.0
		3 +	9.5	10.6	11.7
	Bachelor +	Childless	19.3	21.5	23.6
		1	17.9	20.0	22.1
		2	18.9	20.5	22.1
		3 +	14.8	17.2	19.6
Inactivity	Less than Secondary school	Childless	8.9	11.1	13.3
		1	10.5	12.8	15.1
		2	13.4	14.8	16.3
		3 +	17.4	18.7	20.0
	Secondary school	Childless	5.2	6.4	7.6
		1	7.4	8.3	9.2
		2	10.6	11.5	12.3
		3 +	12.7	14.0	15.2
	Bachelor +	0	0.8	1.6	2.4
		1	0.9	1.9	3.0
		2	1.6	2.4	3.2
		3 +	3.3	5.5	7.8
Retirement	Less than Secondary school	Childless	11.3	12.7	14.1
		1	10.6	11.7	12.8
		2	9.5	10.2	11.0
		3 +	8.3	9.1	9.9
	Secondary school	0	9.9	10.9	11.9
		1	9.2	10.0	10.7
		2	7.7	8.3	8.9
		3 +	6.6	7.4	8.2
	Bachelor +	Childless	7.4	9.4	11.3
		1	8.4	10.5	12.5
		2	7.7	8.9	10.1
		3 +	7.7	9.6	11.5
LE	Less than Secondary school	Childless	28.3	29.5	30.7
		1	31.3	31.6	31.9
		2	31.5	31.7	31.9
		3 +	31.2	31.5	31.8
	Secondary school	Childless	31.6	31.9	32.1
		1	31.1	31.5	31.9
		2	31.8	32.0	32.2
		3 +	31.7	31.9	32.2
	Bachelor +	Childless	32.2	32.4	32.6
		1	32.2	32.4	32.6
		2	31.2	31.8	32.3
		3 +	32.2	32.4	32.6



Table 15 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children –Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Education	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	Less than Secondary	Childless	9.1	11.8	14.4
		1	12.6	15.0	17.4
		2	14.1	15.5	17.0
		3 +	13.8	15.3	16.9
	Secondary school	Childless	15.3	16.3	17.3
		1	19.3	20.2	21.1
		2	18.4	19.0	19.6
		3 +	18.3	19.1	20.0
	Bachelor +	Childless	19.3	22.3	25.4
		1	21.5	23.8	26.1
		2	23.3	24.7	26.2
		3 +	22.0	24.0	26.0
Inactivity	Less than Secondary school	Childless	2.7	5.0	7.2
		1	0.4	2.0	3.5
		2	2.0	3.2	4.4
		3 +	2.6	4.0	5.5
	Secondary school	Childless	2.5	3.2	3.8
		1	0.7	1.0	1.3
		2	1.3	1.5	1.8
		3 +	1.3	1.8	2.3
	Bachelor +	0	0.4	1.7	3.0
		1	0.0	0.2	0.5
		2	0.0	0.1	0.3
		3 +	0.0	0.5	1.1
Retirement	Less than Secondary school	Childless	10.1	12.0	13.9
		1	10.8	12.5	14.1
		2	10.7	11.6	12.5
		3 +	10.1	11.0	11.9
	Secondary school	0	10.2	11.2	12.1
		1	9.1	9.9	10.7
		2	10.0	10.6	11.1
		3 +	9.2	9.9	10.7
	Bachelor +	Childless	4.8	7.7	10.7
		1	5.4	7.7	10.0
		2	5.4	6.9	8.3
		3 +	4.9	6.7	8.5
LE	Less than Secondary school	Childless	27.5	28.8	30.0
		1	28.4	29.4	30.4
		2	30.0	30.4	30.8
		3 +	30.0	30.4	30.8
	Secondary school	Childless	30.1	30.6	31.2
		1	30.8	31.1	31.4
		2	30.9	31.1	31.4
		3 +	30.6	30.9	31.2
	Bachelor +	Childless	31.4	31.8	32.1
		1	31.4	31.8	32.1
		2	31.5	31.7	32.0
		3 +	30.8	31.3	31.7

Table 16 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Education	Number of children	Expectancies		
			2.5%		97.5%
Employment	less than High School	Childless	5.1	8.0	10.9
		1	8.8	11.7	14.6
		2	8.1	9.9	11.7
		3 +	9.4	10.6	11.7
		Childless	13.4	16.4	19.3
		1	15.5	17.7	19.8
		2	16.5	18.2	19.9
		3 +	13.0	16.0	19.1
		Childless	17.0	19.0	20.9
	High School graduate	1	17.3	19.3	21.3
		2	17.7	19.3	20.8
		3 +	17.1	19.1	21.0
		Childless	17.8	21.0	24.3
		1	18.8	21.5	24.1
		2	19.2	21.2	23.3
		3 +	18.0	21.8	25.5
		Childless	10.6	14.4	18.2
		1	9.1	11.9	14.6
	less than High School	2	12.1	14.1	16.1
		3 +	13.9	15.1	16.3
		Childless	5.4	7.1	8.8
		1	5.1	6.7	8.4
		2	5.3	7.0	8.8
		3 +	7.0	8.8	10.6
Childless		4.0	5.9	7.7	
1		4.1	5.5	6.8	
2		4.5	5.6	6.6	
High School graduate	3 +	5.8	7.3	8.7	
	Childless	0.5	3.0	5.5	
	1	1.5	3.6	5.7	
	2	2.0	4.0	6.1	
	3 +	2.8	5.1	7.5	
	Childless	1.8	3.9	6.0	
	1	5.0	7.2	9.4	
	2	4.1	5.4	6.6	
	3 +	4.2	4.9	5.6	
less than High School	Childless	5.8	7.4	9.0	
	1	5.6	7.2	8.7	
	2	6.5	7.4	8.3	
	3 +	6.2	7.0	7.7	
	Childless	6.3	7.6	8.9	
	1	7.1	8.5	9.8	
	2	7.1	8.0	8.8	
	3 +	5.8	6.6	7.5	
	Childless	6.6	8.2	9.9	
some College +	1	6.7	8.4	10.0	
	2	7.3	8.3	9.3	
	3 +	5.8	6.6	7.4	
	Childless	21.9	26.3	30.7	
	1	28.1	30.8	33.5	
	2	27.4	29.4	31.3	
	3 +	29.5	30.6	31.6	
	Childless	28.7	30.8	33.0	
	1	29.7	31.6	33.5	
Ged/Vocational/Associate	2	31.8	32.6	33.4	
	3 +	30.5	31.8	33.1	
	Childless	31.2	32.4	33.6	
	1	32.2	33.2	34.2	
	2	32.0	32.8	33.6	
	3 +	32.3	33.0	33.7	
	Childless	30.1	32.2	34.4	
	1	31.5	33.4	35.3	
	2	32.7	33.6	34.5	
3 +		32.2	33.5	34.8	

Table 17 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 40 to 74, by labor force status, education and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Education	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%	
Employment	less than High School	Childless	8.8	11.1	13.4	
		1	11.5	14.0	16.5	
		2	14.9	17.2	19.6	
	Ged/Vocational/Associate	3 +	15.5	16.8	18.1	
		Childless	15.8	17.6	19.3	
		1	16.3	19.2	22.1	
	High School graduate	2	2	17.8	20.2	22.5
			3 +	17.0	19.1	21.1
			Childless	15.0	18.0	20.9
		1	1	19.8	21.9	23.9
			2	20.5	22.3	24.0
			3 +	18.6	21.1	23.6
		some College +	Childless	19.2	22.5	25.7
			1	20.5	23.9	27.3
			2	21.9	24.9	27.9
Inactivity	less than High School	3 +	21.5	24.9	28.2	
		Childless	8.8	11.1	13.4	
		1	5.8	7.8	9.8	
	Ged/Vocational/Associate	2	3.8	5.2	6.5	
		3 +	5.7	6.7	7.7	
		Childless	3.1	5.1	7.1	
	High School graduate	1	1	2.3	3.7	5.2
			2	1.9	3.2	4.4
			3 +	3.0	3.9	4.8
		2	Childless	2.5	3.2	3.9
			1	1.9	2.5	3.1
			2	1.4	1.9	2.4
		some College +	3 +	2.0	3.1	4.1
			Childless	0.5	2.6	4.6
			1	0.7	2.2	3.6
less than High School	2	2	0.0	1.2	2.6	
		3 +	0.0	1.5	2.9	
		Childless	4.2	6.4	8.7	
	1	1	3.3	5.1	7.0	
		2	5.5	7.1	8.8	
		3 +	5.1	6.1	7.0	
	Ged/Vocational/Associate	Childless	4.6	6.6	8.7	
		1	5.4	6.8	8.2	
		2	6.4	7.4	8.5	
Retirement	less than High School	3 +	6.4	7.2	8.1	
		Childless	6.8	8.2	9.6	
		1	5.7	7.1	8.5	
	High School graduate	2	7.0	8.0	9.1	
		3 +	6.4	7.3	8.2	
		Childless	4.9	7.0	9.1	
	some College +	1	4.8	6.3	7.8	
		2	5.6	6.8	8.0	
		3 +	5.8	6.7	7.6	
	less than High School	Childless	25.6	28.6	31.6	
		1	24.2	26.9	29.6	
		2	27.3	29.5	31.7	
		3 +	28.5	29.6	30.7	
		Childless	27.4	29.2	31.1	
		1	1	27.5	29.8	32.0
2			29.0	30.8	32.5	
3 +			28.8	30.2	31.7	
High School graduate		Childless	27.3	29.4	31.4	
	1	30.2	31.5	32.8		
	2	31.5	32.3	33.0		
	3 +	30.3	31.5	32.6		
	Childless	29.6	32.1	34.5		
	1	1	30.0	32.4	34.7	
		2	31.1	32.9	34.7	
		3 +	31.1	33.0	34.9	
	some College +	Ged/Vocational/Associate	3 +	28.8	30.2	31.7
Childless			27.3	29.4	31.4	
1			30.2	31.5	32.8	
2		2	31.5	32.3	33.0	
		3 +	30.3	31.5	32.6	
		Childless	29.6	32.1	34.5	
1		1	30.0	32.4	34.7	
		2	31.1	32.9	34.7	
		3 +	31.1	33.0	34.9	

Table 18 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Finland, 2000-17

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	8.0	8.3	8.7
	1	8.6	8.9	9.2
	2	9.5	9.7	9.9
	3+	9.1	9.3	9.6
Inactivity	childless	2.5	2.8	3.0
	1	2.4	2.6	2.8
	2	1.9	2.0	2.2
	3+	2.3	2.5	2.7
Retirement	childless	11.5	11.8	12.1
	1	11.6	11.8	12.1
	2	11.5	11.7	11.8
	3+	11.5	11.7	11.9
Life Expectancy	childless	22.8	22.9	23.0
	1	23.2	23.2	23.3
	2	23.4	23.5	23.5
	3+	23.4	23.5	23.5

Table 19 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Finland, 2000-17

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	6.7	7.0	7.3
	1	8.3	8.6	8.9
	2	9.3	9.6	9.8
	3+	9.6	9.8	10.0
Inactivity	childless	3.1	3.3	3.5
	1	2.3	2.5	2.7
	2	1.7	1.9	2.0
	3+	1.6	1.8	1.9
Retirement	childless	10.5	10.8	11.1
	1	10.8	11.0	11.3
	2	10.8	11.0	11.1
	3+	10.7	10.9	11.1
Life Expectancy	childless	20.9	21.1	21.2
	1	22.0	22.1	22.3
	2	22.4	22.5	22.6
	3+	22.4	22.5	22.6

Table 20 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	5.1	6.0	6.9
	1	5.0	5.6	6.1
	2	4.7	5.1	5.4
	3+	2.9	3.3	3.7
Inactivity	childless	3.0	3.6	4.2
	1	4.5	5.2	5.8
	2	7.1	7.6	8.1
	3+	9.7	10.3	11.0
Retirement	childless	13.5	14.4	15.2
	1	12.6	13.2	13.8
	2	10.6	11.0	11.5
	3+	9.6	10.2	10.7
Life Expectancy	childless	23.9	24.0	24.1
	1	23.8	23.9	24.0
	2	23.6	23.7	23.8
	3+	23.7	23.8	23.9

Table 21 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – Italy, 1998-2016

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	7.4	8.2	9.0
	1	8.5	9.2	9.9
	2	8.8	9.2	9.6
	3+	8.2	8.8	9.3
Inactivity	childless	1.1	1.5	1.9
	1	0.4	0.6	0.9
	2	0.4	0.7	0.9
	3+	0.9	1.2	1.5
Retirement	childless	11.9	12.9	13.9
	1	12.2	13.0	13.8
	2	12.6	13.0	13.4
	3+	12.0	12.6	13.1
Life Expectancy	childless	21.9	22.6	23.3
	1	22.3	22.8	23.3
	2	22.7	22.9	23.1
	3+	22.3	22.6	22.8



Table 22 – Women life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	10.1	11.9	11.0
	1	10.4	11.8	11.1
	2	10.3	11.3	10.9
	3+	9.1	9.9	9.6
Inactivity	childless	2.7	3.7	3.2
	1	3.2	4.1	3.6
	2	3.7	4.3	4.0
	3+	5.5	6.2	5.8
Retirement	childless	6.2	7.7	6.9
	1	6.4	7.7	7.0
	2	6.5	7.3	6.8
	3+	5.5	6.2	5.8
Life Expectancy	childless	20.4	21.7	21.0
	1	21.2	22.2	21.7
	2	21.4	22.0	21.7
	3+	20.9	21.5	21.2

Table 23 – Men life expectancy and 95% CI at age 50 to 74, by labor force status and number of children – the U.S., 1999-2019

Status	Number of children	2.5%	Expectancies	97.5%
Employment	childless	9.9	11.7	10.9
	1	10.5	11.9	11.5
	2	11.0	11.9	11.6
	3+	9.9	10.7	10.5
Inactivity	childless	2.8	3.8	3.2
	1	3.1	4.0	3.3
	2	3.2	3.8	3.5
	3+	4.9	5.5	5.1
Retirement	childless	6.2	7.8	6.8
	1	6.4	7.7	6.9
	2	6.5	7.3	6.8
	3+	5.5	6.2	5.8
Life Expectancy	childless	20.4	21.7	21.0
	1	21.3	22.2	21.7
	2	21.5	22.1	21.8
	3+	21.1	21.6	21.4