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G. Savio

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Via Guglielmo Röntgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy
<http://www.dondena.unibocconi.it>

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Beyond the Party Push: Gender Differences in Voters' Persuasion *

Giulia Savio

E-mail: giulia.savio@unito.it.

University of Turin
AXA Research Lab on Gender Equality, Università Bocconi

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Abstract

Despite the efforts to reduce gender gaps, women are still under-represented among politicians. This paper suggests a new channel to explain female disadvantage in electoral success related to politicians' ability to extend their electorate and attract voters from opponent parties. I rely on Swiss elections exploiting several features of this setting. This electoral system is based on open lists (voters can select candidates within their favorite party) and it allows cross-voting (voters can also select candidates from lists other than their favorite). Furthermore, electoral registers report the amount of preference votes collected by each politician separately by the voter's favorite party. I show that individual preference votes are an essential driver of gender differences in candidates' success. Interestingly, while no gender gap emerges in preferences cast by party supporters, male politicians collect more preference votes through cross-voting than females, i.e. they are more successful in persuading voters from competing parties. Motivated by several mechanisms, these new results bring salient policy implications concerning the impact of electoral systems on female representation.

Keywords: gender gap, preference votes, open lists, cross-voting, panachage

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1 Introduction

The gender gap in political empowerment is still large and persistent. According to the most recent data (Global Gender Gap Index, 2023), only 22.1% of this gap has been closed. On average, women held only 26.5% of parliament seats and just 22.8% of all the ministry positions. Furthermore, there has never been a female head of state in more than 80 countries, including progressive economies such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, and the United States.

A vast amount of literature sheds light on women's different barriers to becoming politicians. According to existing studies, women may be less prone to compete for political seats, being more time constrained (compared to men) due to childcare duties (e.g., Schlozman et al., 1994). They may also lack self-confidence (Fox and Lawless, 2004) or motivation to be politicians, given the gender gap in the political market's returns (Júlio and Tavares, 2017). Additionally, parties may not give female candidates enough visibility and may prevent them from advancing in politics (e.g., Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Kjaer and M. L. Krook, 2019). Finally, voters may be biased against female candidates and cast more votes for male candidates (e.g., Schwindt-Bayer et al., 2010; Black and Erickson, 2004).

This paper wishes to enrich the debate on the drivers of the gender gap in politics looking at this phenomenon from a novel perspective. By exploiting first hand data, and a peculiar institutional setting, this study demonstrates that female politicians, compared to males, may be less effective to extend their electorate beyond party supporters, and to persuade voters of different ideologies to choose them.

The paper exploits the institutional setting of Swiss elections and relies on the data available for Ticino - the Italian-speaking Canton of Switzerland. This is indeed the ideal setting to deepen this research. First, I can exploit one characteristic feature

of the Swiss electoral system, i.e., cross-voting (also called panachage), which allows voters to redistribute candidate names from several party lists. As in a standard open list system, voters can express a vote for a party (revealing their ideology), and within that party, they can pick one or more candidates casting preference votes. Furthermore, given the cross-voting option, voters can also use preference votes to pick candidates from lists other than their favorite. Therefore, candidates are explicitly expected to gather support from their party electorate as well as from voters with a different ideology or party affiliation. Second, Canton Ticino makes public the votes collected by each candidate and reports them separately for the different party affiliations of voters who cast a preference vote.

For a candidate c running in party p , the dataset records separately the number of preference votes that candidate c received i) from voters supporting party p , ii) from voters supporting a party $d \neq p$, and iii) from non-partisan voters (voters listing preferred candidates without voting for any party list).

Given the characteristics of the electoral rule and the granularity of the data, I can reveal undetected gender differences in candidates' abilities to target distinct types of voters, i.e., those aligned with the party position of the candidate and those with a different party preference. Additionally, this is the first paper documenting the effects of cross-voting on female representation with observational data. For the Swiss context, Ticino is the only Canton that made available dis-aggregated data at the candidate level to identify voters' ideology, and - to the best of my knowledge - similar data are not available for other countries where cross-voting is in place.

To conduct my investigation, I assembled a unique dataset by merging different sources of information on candidates and elected politicians. These data allow me to track the same candidate across time in different elections (identifying incumbent and new entrant politicians), to control for the exact pre-election candidate position within the

list, and most importantly, to document individual preference votes each candidate collects, dis-aggregated by the type of voters casting the preferences ¹.

This study reaches several conclusions. While I do not detect a robust gender gap in election rates for legislative positions, I estimate that being female is associated with a 3pp (max 4pp) lower probability of being elected in executive bodies (*Municipi*), after controlling for incumbent status and party ideology. Second, I show that the gender gap in *Municipi* is driven by lower preference votes for female candidates. Third, I compare candidates' preference votes cast by different categories of voters: party supporters, opponent parties' supporters doing cross-voting, and non-partisan voters. I highlight the following pattern. Female politicians receive 2pp preference votes less than males through the option of cross-voting. However, I do not detect any robust gender gap neither in the share of preference votes cast by non-partisan voters nor in the share of preference votes cast by voters within their favorite party list.

Although the paper focuses on municipal elections, I also show that the same pattern characterizes upper-level executive elections, where women receive a share of votes 3pp lower than men in panachage compared to when they target voters within their party.

Multiple mechanisms can explain female disadvantage in panachage. With the data at my disposal, I can test some of them. One potential channel deals with the fact that women may have smaller and weaker interpersonal networks compared to men. Under this hypothesis, the gender gap in panachage should increase particularly in bigger cities, where interpersonal connections are more complex to establish. I provide some evidence in favor of this mechanism by analyzing politicians' performance separately for candidates running in towns of different sizes.

Second, a worse performance in panachage could reflect a difficulty of female politi-

¹I distinguish among voters supporting candidate's party, voters supporting other parties, and non-partisan voters

cians to compromise on ideology. I try to shed light on this hypothesis documenting separately the gender gaps in panachage votes cast by voters of the same ideology of the candidate and in panachage votes cast by voters of a different ideology. I show that women perform significantly worse than men in cross-voting mainly in attracting voters of a different ideology. I also document that female candidates are less likely than males to switch political affiliation throughout their political careers. Both these findings suggest that ideological consistency to the party line may play a role in explaining female disadvantage in panachage.

Third, my findings could be driven by gender differences among voters in the use of cross-voting. Indeed, exploiting the Swiss Electoral Survey dataset, I document two trends. First, cross-voting is a habit more prevalent among male voters. Second, voters declare to be driven by same-sex preference when casting a vote for a politician. These two features combined are compatible with the scenario that I document, with female politicians struggling to get support through panachage.

Lastly, I provide suggestive evidence that female candidates' weakness in panachage does not reflect an inferior quality of female politicians. Although data on candidates' quality are unavailable for municipal elections, I show that my results for upper-level elections are robust even controlling for politicians' education.

Beyond the mechanisms, the paper documents how parties deal with female disadvantages in cross-voting. Indeed, I show that the emergence of a gender gap in cross-voting in a given party predicts a lower share of female candidates within the same list in the subsequent election. This pattern is compatible with parties punishing female candidates for a poor performance in panachage by discarding them from party lists.

Overall, this paper wishes to describe politicians' ability to go beyond party affiliation when seeking electoral support and suggests that gender is an essential driver of candidates' multipartisan success. The fact that men are more successful than women in

attracting non-core supporters may be an important piece to rationalize gender gaps in elections also in political contexts that do not formally allow panachage. In local elections, for example, voters are moved also by other drivers than party affiliation. Personal connections, the ability to be trusted, and a successful career may be alternative cards to play for a candidate. If male politicians are more appealing than females in these dimensions, they may have a non-negligible advantage in electoral campaigns. Finally, these results bring important implications regarding the impact of electoral systems on female representation, suggesting that cross-voting electoral systems may backfire on women if not designed in a way that considers female disadvantages in attracting support from other parties' electorate.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature, Section 3 presents the institutional setting and the details of the Swiss electoral system, Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and the identification strategy used in this study, Section 6 presents the findings, and Section 7 investigates the mechanism, Section 8 discusses the implication of my findings on parties' behavior, and Section 9 concludes.

2 Related Literature

This paper contributes to different streams of literature. To start with, the paper contributes to explain the relationship between electoral systems and the gender gap in politics. Electoral rules can generate systematic differences in women's representation (Thames, 2003): modifying those rules may be one of the most effective ways to promote women in politics (Norris and Inglehart, 2001). One crucial difference highlighted by the literature is between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. There is a vast scientific consensus that countries applying proportional rules have a

higher number of women in their national parliaments than those with majoritarian rules (Norris, 1985; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1994; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Vengroff et al. 2003, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). A study on Italy validates this correlation, showing that even within the same country, the introduction of proportional rules in national elections (in place of majoritarian rules) favored women's representation (Profeta and Woodhouse, 2018). There are several reasons why proportional systems may promote greater female representation. The literature concentrated on the following channels: candidates' characteristics, incumbency patterns, district magnitude, and specific features of proportional systems (e.g. open/closed lists or zipper systems, single or multi-member districts). To begin with, proportional and majoritarian systems are associated with parties having different vote-maximizing incentives. In proportional systems parties are incentivized to present a balanced and diversified pool of candidates to appeal to a broader spectrum of voters. Instead, in majoritarian systems, the optimal strategy is to choose the most appealing candidate (Norris, 1985). Moreover, under proportional rules, incumbent politicians are less likely to be re-elected (Norris, 1985, 2006). Consequently, women - likely to be new entrants in many political contexts - may be advantaged. Thirdly, proportional systems are associated with larger district (and party) magnitudes, so parties can pull from deeper in their lists, which increases the chances of picking female candidates (Rule 1987, Norris, 2006). Many studies tried to assess whether the nature of party lists - open or closed - affects female representation within proportional elections. Early works suggested that open lists were preferable for women since they prevented parties from reserving top-list seats to more established male candidates (Shugart, 1994). On the other hand, other studies point out that open lists may encourage politicians to cultivate the personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995), which may backfire on women in the presence of cultural gender biases. My study analyzes gender gaps in preference votes

in a proportional open list system with cross-voting. To the best of my knowledge, only another paper focuses on the effects of cross-voting on female representation. In particular, by implementing an online experiment, Golder et al., 2017 find that an open lists system with panachage - compared to a close list system and to an open list system without panachage - increases preference votes for female candidates in the context of European elections. My conclusions, though, do not align with this message. Indeed, I find that the option of cross-voting can harm female candidates. In particular, when voters cast preference votes for candidates from a different party than their favorite one, they tend to prefer male candidates to female ones. It is important to notice, though, that Golder et al., 2017 consider an online experimental setting in which there is no interaction between politicians and the electorate, and agents are asked to express “fictitious” voting decisions without bearing the consequences of their choices. Moreover, they focus on renowned politicians who run for the 2014 European Parliament elections. I analyze the context of municipal and cantonal elections, in which most candidates are in the early stages of their career and need to engage in intense political campaigns to get known. Given the context in which the study is performed, I find it challenging to reconduct the study by Golder et al., 2017 to mine, and I assume some of the mechanisms that explain my results are shut down in that experimental setting.

Moreover, this paper relates to the literature on preferential voting. Preference votes may signal candidates’ popularity and their electability to parties (Crisp et al. 2013). Analysis among parties in Sweden’s semi-open-list system and in Brazil’s open-list system suggest that parties may use preference votes to test candidates’ popularity and to promote the most successful ones to more powerful roles. Also, preference votes make politicians’ nomination and promotion processes more transparent, reducing the risk of intra-party conflicts (or limiting the negative consequences of such disputes)

(Kemahlioglu et al, 2009; Ware, 2002). Other studies, however, suggest that preference votes appear to be highly ineffective in reshaping candidates' order within the list, as voters continue to cast their preferences for candidates at the top of the list (Farrell, 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005).

Concerning gender, empirical studies reached mixed conclusions. Some studies find evidence of general voters' predisposition to choose male over female candidates or vice versa (Black et al, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, Ragauskas, 2021, Dean, 2021). Moreover, by promoting within-party competition, preference votes may select the best candidates and improve gender equality at the top (Folke et al, 2016). In Polish open-list systems, for example, preference votes cast by the electorate shifted women higher up in the post-election ranking, compared with the original one proposed by the party, increasing the share of female elected politicians. Also, preference votes can be used as a powerful affirmative action tool to encourage voters to express more gender-balanced preferences. In Italy, the introduction of double preference voting, by allowing voters to express two preference votes for candidates of different genders, increased the number of female elected politicians by 19pp, and had long-run effects on voter attitudes toward female candidates (Baltrunaite et al, 2019). However, some other studies found little evidence of an independent effect of candidate gender on voter choice in preferential systems (Shair-Rosenfields, 2014; McElroy 2010). For example, preference votes in Denmark found that political candidates' gender is less important for male and female voters than other characteristics with preference voting. My paper contributes to this literature by showing that a gender gap in preference votes is more severe when voters cast their preferences for politicians of a different party compared to their favorite one. This new finding wishes to widen the debate on the relevant dimensions within electoral campaigns that women should consider to narrow the gap with male politicians.

3 Institutional Setting

This paper relies on the institutional setting and data of Canton Ticino, Switzerland. Despite being a well-established democratic country, Switzerland has been historically quite traditional concerning gender roles. Indeed, female suffrage was introduced at the federal level for the first time in 1971 and fully extended at the cantonal and municipal levels only in 1991. However, nowadays, Swiss performance in terms of gender parity in politics (GGI subindex of 0.494) is similar to neighboring states (Germany 0.509 - Austria 0.473 - Italy - 0.313 - France 0.457). Within Switzerland, Ticino is the only fully Italian-speaking Canton. Located south-more in Switzerland, it shares international borders with Italy and national borders with the Canton of Valais (to the northwest), the Canton of Uri (to the north), and the Canton of Grisons (to the northeast). It has a population of 350,986 citizens spread out over 106 cities.

The Swiss political system lays its foundations on the principle of direct democracy. Switzerland is indeed a semi-direct democratic federal republic. The citizens directly make many decisions through referendum and popular initiatives. A system of three levels rules the confederation: federal, cantonal, and municipal. At the federal level, legislative power is detained by the Federal Assembly, a parliament made by two chambers, the National Council and the Council of States. The executive power is exercised by the Federal Council, a body of seven members elected by the Federal Assembly. At the cantonal level, the Gran Consiglio and the Council of State are the legislative and executive authorities elected by the citizens. Although I extend my results to federal and cantonal elections, this paper relies primarily on municipal elections, which are in place every four years and are staggered (*i.e.*, they do not happen in all the municipalities simultaneously). In each municipality, people vote at the same time for the composition of two institutional bodies, *Municipio* (the executive body) and *Consiglio*

(the legislative body).

The two chambers' electoral system is identical and proportional with open lists and panachage. Panachage is a characteristic of the Swiss electoral system (also known more generally as cross-voting, and implemented in other countries²), which consists of voting for candidates from different party lists. Voters are first asked to choose a favorite list by crossing only one option among the parties named on the ballot. Note that this choice is not mandatory, i.e., voters can decide not to vote for any party. Second, voters can signal their favorite candidates for executive and legislative chambers by expressing preference votes. The maximum number of preference votes allowed coincides with the seats available. Since bigger municipalities have larger chambers, the number of preference votes allowed changes according to the city's population. Figure 1 summarizes voters' options when casting preference votes.

[Figure 1 here]

Voters can select candidates belonging to their favorite list (a), they can choose candidates belonging to a different list than the one they voted for (b), they can select candidates belonging to different lists (c), and finally, they can support candidates even when not selecting any favorite party in the first place (d). This last type of voters will be called “non-partisan voters” in the rest of the paper, while options b and c are examples of cross-voting. Voters who behave as in option (a) will be called “party supporters”. Once elections end, each candidate collects a total number of votes, adding up several components, namely the total number of party votes collected by her/his list (equal to the number of supporters of the party), the number of preference votes cast by party voters, the number of preference votes cast by opponent parties'

²Cross-voting, intended as an option to express preference votes for candidates in different electoral lists, is in the in place in Luxemburg, German Lands, France, Belgium, and Italy in municipal elections. In Italy, this practice is also known as “Voto Disgiunto”.

supporters through panachage, and finally the number of preference votes cast by non-partisan voters.

Members of the two bodies are appointed in two steps. In step 1, seats are assigned to each list based on party performance. In step 2, given the seats allocated to each list, parties appoint their most successful candidates based on the number of preference votes they gathered. Step 1 deviates from a simple proportional rule in the Swiss electoral system. Indeed, seats are assigned to parties based on a score which reflect positively i) the number of votes collected by each list, and ii) panachage votes collected by candidates within the party, and negatively iii) panachage votes given by party supporters to candidates of opponent parties. More precisely, the score of a given party will increase if the party gets more list votes or if its candidates collect more panachage votes cast by supporters of other lists. On the contrary, the score of a given party will decrease if its voters support through panachage candidates belonging to other lists. The relevance of panachage votes for the number of party seats may create incentives for parties in the candidates' choice. Indeed, parties should prefer candidates performing well in cross-voting (to those who do poorly) as they can guarantee more seats are assigned to the list.

In Step 2, candidates appointed within each list are those with a higher number of individual votes, which are the sum of preference votes cast by party supporters, preference votes of other party 's voters, and preference votes of non-partisan voters. As a consequence of this setting, both in step 1 and in step 2, preference votes are the key drivers of electoral competition across and within parties.

4 Data

I assembled a unique dataset of politicians running in Canton Ticino municipal elections from 2009 to 2023. Data were obtained from the website of the statistical office of Canton Ticino. For elections from 2009 to 2023, the dataset includes the following information: the election status of each candidate, his/her gender, the incumbent status, the total number of preference votes collected, his/her party affiliation, party ideology, the municipality in which he/she runs. For elections from 2016 to 2023, the dataset includes additional information, precisely the position of the candidate within the list (ex-ante election ranking), the exact composition of the candidate’s votes (preference votes cast by the candidate’s party supporters, preference votes cast by other parties’ supporters, and preference votes cast by non-partisan voters), and the candidate date of birth. The dataset collects information on 17070 candidates running for the legislative chambers (*Consigli*) and on 4664 candidates running for the executive chambers (*Municipi*). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of candidates for *Consigli* (Panel A) and *Municipi* (Panel B).

[Table 1 here]

Candidates seem pretty similar in the two chambers, w.r.t. age (mid-40), the probability of being an incumbent (around 23% and 21%), and ideology (a large majority of right-wing candidates, followed by a similar amount of left-wing and civic lists³). The probability of being elected is higher in *Consigli* (43%) than in *Municipi* (33%). The average position of candidates within the list (“Ranking”) differs across the two chambers (12.10 in *Consigli*, and 3.22 in *Municipi*), given the different length of party

³Civic lists are lists with no official connection with a national political party or with a specific ideology, and which campaign on local issues. They are common in municipal elections in other countries as well, such as Italy.

lists in the two bodies (maximum 60 seats in *Consigli* and maximum 14 seats in *Municipi*). The gender gap among candidates is quite pronounced in both chambers and shows up for different ideologies. The share of female candidates is 32% in *Consigli*, and 27% in Municipal councils. Right-wing parties are more male-dominated than left-wing parties and civic lists, which are still far from a balanced representation.⁴ Women only represent on average 29% of the elected politicians in *Consigli*, and 19% in *Municipi*. To understand in which dimensions female and male politicians differ, I report t-test statistics for differences in demographics and political characteristics in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

While the average position of candidates in party lists is similar for females and males, female candidates are younger than men and have higher chances to be new entrant. Finally, women are more likely to run in left-wing parties and in civic lists than in right-wing parties.

5 Identification Strategy

In order to document the gender gap in the probability of winning an election, I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{cpmy} = \alpha + \beta Female_c + \eta X_c + Z_m + T_y + I_y \epsilon_{cpmy} \quad (1)$$

I use as a dependent variable a dummy *Elected* equal to one if candidate c running in party p in municipality m in year y is elected, and zero otherwise. Female is a dummy variable equal to one for female candidates. Vector X includes the age of the

⁴In *Consigli*, women are 27% of the candidates in right-wing parties, 37% in left-wing parties, and 35% in civic lists. In *Municipi*, they are 24% in right-wing parties, 31% in left-wing parties, and 26% in civic lists.

candidate, a dummy *Incumbent* equal to one if the candidate has been elected before and zero otherwise, and the dummies *Left* and *Civic* to control for candidate ideology. Hence, I omit the dummy for right-wing parties. I also add municipal fixed effects, years fixed effects, and party fixed effects.

Next, I investigate the drivers of the gender gap in elections. Two alternative stories could explain the higher success rate of male politicians. On the one hand, male candidates - compared to females - may be more likely to run in very established parties, who get more party votes. On the other hand, male candidates may collect individually more preference votes than female candidates. To disentangle the two channels, I run equation (1) relying on two dependent variables, namely i) *PartyVotes* (list votes collected by party p , to which candidate c belongs), and *SharePref.Votes* (individual votes collected by candidate c over total number of individual votes collected by all candidates in party p). In this second regression, I also control from incumbent status, ideology, ranking position, and for the total number of candidates in the list.

Finally, I want to identify which of the following three categories of individual votes is driving the gender gap in candidates' success: i) preference votes cast by party supporters, ii) preference votes cast by opponent parties' voters through cross-voting, iii) and preference votes cast by non-partisan voters. I reshaped the dataset in a long format, obtaining an individual panel dataset, which documents for each candidate the shares of votes cast respectively by these three types of voters (party supporters, opponent party voters, and non-partisan voters). The shares are given by the number of votes in each category k collected by a candidate c running in party p , over the total number of votes collected by all candidates within the same party p in the same category of votes k . Therefore, I run the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
SharePV_{ckpmy} = & \alpha + \beta Female_c + \gamma CrossVoting_{ckpmy} + \delta NonPartisan_{ckpmy} + \\
& \theta Female \times CrossVoting + \sigma Female \times NonPartisan + \eta X_c + Z_m + T_y + I_y \epsilon_{ckpmy}
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $SharePV_{ckpmy}$ is the share of preference votes in category k collected by candidate c in party p in municipality m in year y , $CrossVoting$ is a dummy one for the share of votes cast by other parties' supporters, and $NonPartisan$ is a dummy one for the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The omitted variable is the dummy identifying the share of preferences cast by supporters of the own party.

While β captures the gender gap in preference votes cast by supporters of the candidate's party, the coefficients θ and σ are difference-in-difference estimators. θ compares the share of preference votes collected by female politicians to the share collected by males, which opponent parties' supporters cast with respect to own party voters. Similarly, σ compares the share of preference votes collected by female politicians to the share collected by male politicians, which non-partisan voters cast with respect to own party voters. Therefore, if the gender gap amplifies in panachage votes compared to preferences cast by party supporters, β is expected to be positive and significant.

6 Results

6.1 Gender gap in candidates' success

My first goal is to assess whether being a female candidate predicts a lower chance to be elected in *Consigli* and in *Municipi*. In *Consigli* (Table 3), the coefficient of the dummy *Female* is negative in columns 1 and 2, predicting that being a female candidate is associated with a 4pp lower probability of being elected. However, results change substantially, once the variable *Incumbent* is added to the model. Being incumbent is indeed associated to a 0.5 pp higher probability of being elected, and it

absorbs completely the effect of gender on the chances to be appointed. Moving to *Municipi* (Table 4), the coefficient for *Female* is always negative. Although it varies in magnitude (ranging from -0.14 to -0.04), it remains consistent in sign and strongly significant, even controlling for incumbent status and for party ideology.

[Tables 3 and 4 here]

Two scenarios are compatible with the documented gender gap in election rates. First, it could be that women - compared to men - tend to run for less established parties and receive fewer list votes. Second, it is also possible that women and men compete in parties equally successful, but women collect fewer individual preference votes than men. In Table 5, I investigate whether being a female candidate predicts lower party votes or lower shares of individual preference votes.

[Tables 5 here]

Not surprisingly, in *Consigli* (columns 1 and 2), the dummy *Female* does not explain neither party votes nor preference votes. This is expected, given that the gender gap in the probability of being elected is not robust. In *Municipi* (columns 3 and 4), instead, female candidates collect 1.7 pp lower share of preference votes when controlling for age, incumbent status, ex ante position within the list, and ideology. As explained above, individual preference votes can be expressed by different types of voters. My next goal is to understand which category of preferential votes is driving the gender gap in election rates. For this purpose, I distinguish among preference votes cast by i) candidate's party supporters, ii) opponent parties' voters through cross-voting, and iii) non-partisan voters. A first insight comes from Figure 2.

For *Consigli*, although a gender gap does not emerge neither in the share of preferences cast within the party, nor in the share of preferences cast by non partisan voters,

the share of preferences cast through cross-voting by opponent parties' supporters seems slightly higher for male candidates than for female candidates. In *Municipi*, male candidates always receive more votes than females, but the gender gap is more pronounced in the share of preferences coming from cross-voting. As documented in Figure 3, this pattern is consistent for all the candidates running in *Municipi*, irrespective of their ideology.

[Figures 2 and 3 here]

Moving to the regressions, I exploit a candidate panel dataset to run equation 2 described in Section 5. Hence, I compare the gender gaps in the different types of individual preference votes (cast by party supporters, by opponent parties' voters through panachage, and by non-partisan voters). Results for *Consigli* and *Municipi* are reported in Tables 6 and 7.

[Tables 6 and 7 here]

In *Consigli*, the gender gap within parties is never significant. However, the coefficient of the interaction term $CrossVoting \times Female$ (negative in sign across all the specification) gets significantly negative once candidate fixed effects are included in the model⁵. In *Municipi*, the gender gap in the share of votes cast within the party is not significantly different from zero once controlling for incumbent politicians (see β coefficient), and it is not statistically different from the gender gap in votes cast by non-partisan voters (see σ coefficient). Conversely, the gender gap in votes cast by other parties' supporters through cross-voting is significantly lower than the gender gap within the party (see θ coefficient). Consistently across all the specifications, and confirmed also when candidates fixed effects are added (column 6), women collect

⁵Results for candidates running in *Consigli* are similar even restricting the analysis for the subsample of candidates who also run for positions in *Municipi*

through panachage a share of votes which is 2pp lower than men. Considering that the average share of panachage votes collected by candidates in *Municipi* is 0.06, a difference of 2pp in cross-voting translates in a quite sizable disadvantage of female politicians (women collect a share of preference votes which is 33% less than men).

In Table 8, I replicate the same analysis splitting candidates on the basis of their ideology (I distinguish among right-wing, left-wing, and civic list candidates).

[Table 8 here]

When testing heterogeneous effects across ideologies, being female is not always associated with lower success within the party. Indeed, in left-wing parties, female candidates collect a 2pp higher share of preference votes cast by party supporters. In civic lists and right-wing parties, instead, women seem to be slightly disadvantaged compared to men (the coefficient β in columns 1-2, and 7-8 is negative but never significant). However, consistently across ideologies and in line with Figure 3, the coefficient δ of the interaction term $Female \times CrossVoting$ is always negative. Although the coefficient δ is higher and always significant for left-wing politicians, it turns significant even for right-wing politicians once candidate fixed effects are included in the model. Hence, within the same candidate and irrespective of her/his ideological position, the gap between the share of preference votes cast by party supporters and the share of preference votes cast with cross-voting is higher for women than for men.

In conclusion, I find that the gender gap in election rates is much larger and persistent in *Municipi* than in *Consigli*. In particular, women underperform men when running for executive positions mainly when they target non-party supporters. This difference between the two chambers may be rationalized considering that executive roles guarantee a stronger power, and selection among candidates is more ruthless. The reading of these findings shows that, all other characteristics being equal, female candidates

still struggle when seeking multipartisan support to rule.

6.2 External validity: Upper-level elections

Are these findings specific to municipal elections or can be extended to upper-level elections? In order to answer this question, I consider upper-level elections for Canton Ticino, for legislative and executive bodies at cantonal and federal levels.

Upper legislative elections occur at the federal level (with the direct election of Consiglio Nazionale every four years) and at the cantonal level (with the direct election of Gran Consiglio every four years). Upper executive elections only occur at the cantonal level, where people vote for Consiglio di Stato every four years. Following the same approach used for municipal elections, I compare female and male candidates' preferential votes cast by different types of voters, i.e., party supporters, cross-party voters, and non-partisan voters. Consistently with local elections, no gender gap emerges in any of the three categories of votes in upper-level elections for the legislative chambers of Consiglio Nazionale and Gran Consiglio (Table 9).

Instead, a gender gap emerges in all the three categories of votes for the elections of the executive cantonal body Consiglio di Stato (Table 10). Similarly to local-level results, the gender gap in preferences is more pronounced in cross-voting. This evidence suggests that panachage particularly disfavors female candidates running for executive chambers also in higher-level elections.

[Tables 9 and 10 here]

7 Insights on the mechanisms

The main result of my analysis is that particularly in *Municipi* women receive fewer preference votes than men from opponent parties' voters, but not from their party

supporters. With the data at my disposal, I consider several mechanisms to explain why cross-voting may backfire on women. The first explanation behind my results is related to gender differences in networks. According to recent labour economics' studies, women and men exploit their networks differently (Mengel, 2020, Beaman et al., 2018, Zeltzer, 2020) and obtain different advantages that reflect differences in network structures (Lindenlaub and Prummer, 2021, Lalanne and Seabright, 2022, Neugart and Zaharieva, 2018, Yang et al., 2019). Since gender differences in social networks may therefore be key in explaining gender differences in career trajectories and in labor market outcomes, they may be relevant also in explaining gender gap in electoral success. Indeed, there are no reasons not to extend these general considerations to politicians as well. In the setting analyzed in this paper, gender differences in networks could have a role in particular in explaining the gender gap in panachage. Indeed, it is often the case that - through panachage - a voter picks candidates that are known to her/him not because of the party campaign, but as they belong to her/his personal network. If men have broader networks than women, or if they are better in leveraging their contacts to seek support, they may be more successful than women particularly in persuading voters from a different ideology through cross-voting. Following Funk, 2020, I exploit the fact that in Switzerland city size captures well connectedness, and I assume that networks are tighter in towns of limited size. Under this assumption, if gender differences in networks explain female disadvantage in cross-voting, we should observe that the gender gap in panachage shrinks in smaller towns compared to bigger ones. As shown in Table [11](#) for *Municipi*, I consider three groups of municipalities: those below 1000 inhabitants, those between 1000 and 5000, and those above 5000 inhabitants.

[Table [11](#) here]

Cities above 1000 inhabitants mostly drive the gender gap in panachage votes, while in cities below 1000, the coefficient $Female \times CrossVoting$ is never significant. This pattern signals that worst networking capabilities may play a role in explaining the gender differences in cross-voting.

Another possible mechanism behind my results is that female politicians may be more attached to the party they run with, and more constrained by his ideology. This could be either because of demand or supply. Indeed, female politicians could find more difficult to switch party during their career, given the higher barriers to entry that they face (compared to male colleagues), and consequently they may not develop multipartisan attitudes.

Coversely, it could be that women are per-se more loyal and attached to the party, and intrinsically less willing to compromise on ideology than men. In both cases, the gender gap in cross-voting may be due to gender differences in candidates' success to attract voters of different ideologies. In order to investigate this channel, I focus on votes cast through panachage by non-party supporters. In columns 1-3 of Table [12](#), I show that women seem not to have a significant disadvantage compared to men when targeting voters of an ideology similar to their own. Instead, they collect a significantly lower percentage of panachage votes when targeting voters of a different ideology (columns 4-6).

[Table [12](#) here]

This result should be read in conjunction with the fact that female politicians are also significantly less likely to switch party affiliation over time. Indeed, the share of politicians switching ideological affiliation is 4% for women and 6% for men in *Municipio*⁶. This evidence suggest that female politicians seem to be more constrained by ideology in their career choices, and even when they seek electoral support.

⁶In Consiglio, the share of politicians switching ideologies is 3% for women and 5% for men)

Third, female politicians' disadvantage in panachage could be driven by the fact that the cross-voting option captures a peculiar type of voter, less likely to support women. To test this hypothesis, I rely on the Swiss Electoral Survey, which document voters' habit in the occasion of federal elections [7](#). In Table [13](#), I look at four outcomes: turnout in cantonal and federal elections (columns 1-2), likelihood of using panachage option (columns 3), and likelihood to vote for a politician of the same gender of the voter (columns 4).

[Table [13](#) here]

Although turnout does not vary in a significant way for female compared to male citizens, female voters are less likely to use panachage compared to male voters. Moreover, same-sex preferences emerge from voters' declarations (columns 4-5), which translates to male voters preferring male candidates and female voters preferring female candidates. These two findings, 1) panachage reflecting (on average) male voters and 2) same-sex preferences of voters for politicians, are compatible with female disadvantage in votes collected by cross-voting compared to votes cast by party supporters. Finally, I take into account the claim that female disadvantage in panachage may reflect an inferior quality of women compared to men. Worst candidates are indeed less likely to be disadvantaged in votes cast by party supporters than in panachage votes. While the party could act as a trustee with the electorate, and re-direct votes also in favor of bad candidates within the list, it may not have the same persuasive power with panachage voters. Panachage votes, indeed, reflect candidates' individual effort, signaling politicians' own ability to gain consensus independently from the party. Empirically, I provide suggestive evidence against this explanation. Although the level of education is not recorded in the electoral data at any level, I manually collected

⁷I restrict my analysis to Canton Ticino voters.

this information from candidates' online curricula for candidates of upper executive bodies. Consistently with other settings, female candidates are more educated than men (68% of women have a degree compared to 59% of men). I then replicate Table [10](#) controlling for a dummy *TertiaryEducation*, equal to one if the candidate obtained a university degree. As shown in Table [A.3](#), the coefficient of the interaction term $Female \times CrossVoting$ is unaffected by the inclusion of this control variable.

[Table [A.3](#) here]

8 Party response to gender gap in cross-voting

As explained in Section 3, panachage votes affect the probability that a candidate is appointed for two reasons. First, given party seats, the higher the number of preference votes for a candidate, the higher the probability that she/he will be elected within her/his list. Moreover, panachage votes (together with list votes) also count for the allocation of party seats. While parties cannot directly control which candidate is inflating the number of list votes, they can perfectly identify the candidates that perform better in cross-voting. Individual preference votes collected by candidates (cast by party supporters and cast through cross-voting) are public information. Therefore, parties may be incentivized to screen their candidates based on their ability to collect panachage votes and re-propose those who performed well in future elections. On the contrary, parties may want to discard the worst politicians. Consequently, women who performed poorly in cross-voting in a given election may be less likely to be chosen as candidates in a subsequent election⁸. In order to shed light on this dynamic, I restrict

⁸Additionally, if parties realize that poor-performing candidates are more likely to be female, they may implement statistical discrimination. Hence, they may decide not only to replace their low-performing (female) candidates with new ones but also to reduce the number of list seats allocated to female politicians.

my attention to parties running for two consecutive elections in the same municipality. Unfortunately, I only have 90 of these cases. However, despite the small sample, I see that parties characterized by a gender gap in cross-voting in a given election, reduce the share of female candidates in their lists in the subsequent election. Table [14](#) reports my results.

[Table [14](#) here]

Parties characterized by male candidates who outperform females in elections at time $t-1$ with respect to panachage votes, reduce female candidate supply in subsequent elections by 8 up to 19pp. Note that while the coefficient of the variable “*Gender Gap in CrossVoting*” is always positive and significant in 3 out of 4 specifications, the coefficient of “*Gender Gap in Pref.Votes WP*” (capturing gender gap in preference votes cast by party supporters) is always insignificant and less stable. The low explanatory power of the gender gap in preference votes cast by party supporters is expected, since they do not count in the allocation of seats to parties and therefore they should not matter so much for parties’ strategic decisions on candidates.

9 Conclusions

Shedding light on the roots of female under-representation is key to improve female political empowerment. Even though our understanding of the glass ceiling in politics advanced thanks to the existing papers, many unknown dimensions in which female and male politicians may differ still deserve to be investigated. This paper focuses on politicians’ ability to gain electoral support individually and documents gender differences in the amount and type of preference votes collected. My conclusion is that, consistently across different ideologies, female politicians running for executive

roles perform worse than men, particularly in collecting preference votes through cross-voting. I provide suggestive evidence on the mechanisms behind these results. First, I show that the magnitude of gender gaps in votes collected through panachage is higher in bigger municipalities than in smaller ones, where personal connections are presumably more challenging to establish. This would suggest that gender gaps in networks may play a role in explaining differential outcomes in multipartisan success.

Second, I show that women perform significantly worse than men in cross-voting, mainly in attracting voters of a different ideology. Besides, women are less likely than men to switch parties and even change ideological affiliation. These findings suggest that women tend to be more ideologically constrained and, consequently, more disfavored in cross-voting. Moreover, exploiting voters' survey data, I show that my results could be driven by the fact that cross-voting is a habit more spread among male voters, who also declare to prefer candidates of their own gender.

This study can contribute to the debate on the gender gap in politics in two ways. On the one hand, it is reasonable to think that the documented disadvantage of female politicians may occur in other settings as well, irrespective of the panachage option. Indeed, also in the presence of electoral systems with no formal option of cross-voting, voters still choose politicians based also on attributes other than party affiliation. Particularly in local contexts, such as municipal elections, voters can refer to their networks to pick their favorite candidates. In those settings, the fact that male politicians are better at gaining support beyond the party push may increase the gender gap in election rates.

On the other hand, the paper analyzes cross-voting as a feature of electoral systems and sheds light on its policy implications on gender equality. Indeed, the option to reshuffle party lists through panachage can backfire on women in two ways. First, and most obviously, the worst performance in cross-voting mechanically translates

into lower shares of individual votes for women, reducing their probability of being appointed as councilors once seats are assigned to their party. Second, by attracting fewer votes through panachage, female candidates may deflate the number of seats assigned to their lists, generating incentives for parties to choose male over female candidates. Indeed, my data reveal a pattern compatible with parties replacing female candidates with male colleagues when they perform poorly in cross-voting. This evidence brings us to a final consideration. If female representation in politics is a social concern, we should be aware of the potential adverse effects that voting rules may have on women. Policymakers may consider to adopt strategies in order to mitigate such undesired effects. In the case of cross-voting, it is crucial to anticipate internal party dynamics that could translate into a shortage of female candidates. Even if panachage is a non-negotiable feature of an electoral system (i.e., for countries that want to ensure a cross-party political balance), coupling it with affirmative action measures could prevent women to be excluded from party lists. In light of these considerations, gender quotas would be, in presence of panachage, a valuable response to guarantee at least some minimum female representation in party lists.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Ballot's options

Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option a)

Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1		
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option b)

Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1		
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option c)

Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option d)

Figure 2: Gender gap in the share of individual votes, by category of voters



Figure 3: Gender gap in the share of individual votes in Municipi, by ideology



Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Elected	0.429	0.495	0	1	17070
Female	0.321	0.467	0	1	17070
Age	46.184	13.679	15	92	17070
Left-wing	0.195	0.397	0	1	17070
Right-wing	0.63	0.483	0	1	17070
Civic list	0.174	0.379	0	1	17070
Tot Pref	726.345	972.391	26	10731	17070
Incumbent	0.237	0.425	0	1	16202
Ranking	12.102	10.59	1	60	10860
Tot Pref. Votes	765.075	1021.358	36	10731	10860
Party Votes	506.964	758.788	8	4615	10860
Pref. Within Party	134.24	172.391	4	3334	10860
Pref. Non-Partisan	58.578	82.883	0	2272	10860
Pref. Cross-Voting	74.845	161.685	0	5017	10860
Panel B: Municipi					
Elected	0.334	0.472	0	1	4664
Female	0.27	0.444	0	1	4664
Age	48.41	12.394	18	86	4664
Left-wing	0.211	0.408	0	1	4664
Right-wing	0.623	0.485	0	1	4664
Civic list	0.166	0.372	0	1	4664
Incumbent	0.211	0.408	0	1	4448
Ranking	3.227	1.835	1	14	3002
Tot Pref. Votes	679.641	1130.777	40	13862	3002
Party Votes	387.209	644.218	6	5727	3002
Pref. Within Party	157.805	292.969	5	4660	3002
Pref. Non-Partisan	70.243	136.962	0	2718	3002
Pref. Cross-Voting	75.219	236.026	0	5584	3002

Notes. The table reports summary statistics of politicians running in Consigli (Panel A) and in Municipi (Panel B). Demographic covariates are dummies Female and Age. Political controls include dummy variables Elected (equal to one for elected candidates, and zero otherwise), Left-wing, Right-wing, and Civic-list capturing politicians' ideology, and Incumbent (equal to one for politicians rerunning as candidates during their mandate, and zero otherwise), and the following discrete variables: candidate position within the list (Ranking), votes collected by the party to which the candidate belongs (Party Votes), and the different types of preference votes collected individually by each politician, namely preference votes cast by party supporters (Pref. Within Party), preference votes cast by non-party supporters (Pref. Non-Partisan), and preference votes cast through the options of panachage (Pref. Cross-Voting)

Table 2: Gender differences in candidates' covariates

Votes	Male			Female			Diff. in Means
	No.Obs	Mean	Std.Err	No.Obs	Mean	Std.Err	P-Value
Panel A: Consigli							
Age	7,378	47.12	0.16	3,482	45.12	0.23	0.00
Ranking	7,378	12.07	0.12	3,482	12.17	0.18	0.65
Incumbent	7,378	0.25	0.01	3,482	0.17	0.01	0.00
Left-wing	7,378	0.15	0.00	3,482	0.20	0.01	0.00
Right-wing	7,378	0.66	0.01	3,482	0.58	0.01	0.00
Civic	7,378	0.18	0.00	3,482	0.21	0.01	0.00
Panel B: Municipi							
Age	2,171	49.77	0.27	831	46.16	0.40	0.00
Ranking	2,171	3.20	0.04	831	3.30	0.06	0.20
Incumbent	2,171	0.25	0.01	831	0.10	0.01	0.00
Left	2,171	0.17	0.01	831	0.23	0.01	0.00
Right	2,171	0.65	0.01	831	0.59	0.01	0.00
Civic	2,171	0.18	0.01	831	0.18	9.01	0.88

Notes. The table reports two-sample ttest to verify if politicians' covariates are equal, by gender. The test is performed separately for politicians running for Consigli (Panel A), and for politicians running for Municipi (Panel B). Variables tested include discrete variables as age of the politician (Age), and her/his position in the list (Ranking), and dummy variables for incumbent status (Incumbent) and for the ideology of the candidate (Left-wing, Right-wing, and Civic list). For each gender, the table reports numerosity, mean and standard error. P-values of the ttest are reported in the last column.

Table 3: Elected Politicians in Consigli

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.007)
Age		0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Incumbent			0.562*** (0.011)	0.561*** (0.011)	0.568*** (0.007)
Left-wing				-0.005 (0.010)	
Civic list				-0.018 (0.011)	
R-squared	0.002	0.075	0.291	0.291	0.326
N	17070	17070	16202	16202	16202
Municipal FE	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. The table documents the drivers of electoral success in local elections from 2009 to 2021. Only candidates running for Consigli are included in the analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the candidate is elected and zero otherwise. Female, Left-wing, Civic list, and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Elected politicians in Municipi

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.136*** (0.016)	-0.104*** (0.015)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.046*** (0.014)
Age		0.006*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)
Incumbent			0.635*** (0.013)	0.631*** (0.013)	0.637*** (0.016)
Left-wing				-0.058*** (0.014)	
Civic list				-0.033* (0.018)	
R-squared	0.016	0.090	0.358	0.360	0.431
N	4664	4664	4448	4448	4448
Municipal FE	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. The table documents the drivers of electoral success in local elections from 2009 to 2021. Only candidates running for Municipi are included in the analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the candidate is elected and zero otherwise. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Party Votes and Preference votes

Chamber	Consigli		Municipi	
	Party Votes	Sh. Pref Votes	Party Votes	Sh. Pref Votes
Dep Var	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-21.837 (13.841)	-0.001 (0.001)	-10.713 (15.370)	-0.017*** (0.006)
Age	-1.370** (0.548)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.854** (0.737)	0.000*** (0.000)
Incumbent	52.082*** (12.055)	0.026*** (0.003)	104.331*** (23.024)	0.082*** (0.010)
Ranking	8.145*** (1.958)	-0.001*** (0.000)	13.863*** (3.591)	-0.020*** (0.003)
Left-wing	-296.017*** (105.069)	0.021*** (0.005)	-248.689*** (77.107)	0.053*** (0.015)
Civic list	-96.216 (81.037)	0.015*** (0.005)	-163.912*** (44.430)	0.060*** (0.017)
R-squared	0.719	0.283	0.650	0.318
N	10860	10860	3002	3002
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes. The table documents candidates' performance in Municipi (columns 1-2) and in Consigli (columns 3-4) in elections from 2016 to 2023. The dependent variables are i) Party Votes (columns 1,3), which coincides - for each candidate - with her/his party's supporters, and ii) Share of Preference Votes, given by the number of individual votes collected by each candidate, over the total number of preference votes collected by all candidates within his/her list. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Preference votes in Consigli

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female (β)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	
CrossVoting	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
NonPartisan	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female X CrossVoting (θ)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)
Female X NonPartisan (σ)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Incumbent		0.037*** (0.001)	0.038*** (0.001)	0.040*** (0.001)	
Age		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	
Ranking		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	
Left-wing			0.018*** (0.001)		
Civic list			0.016*** (0.001)		
R-squared	0.163	0.256	0.270	0.577	0.921
N	32580	32580	32580	32580	32580
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in Consigli in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023. In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties' voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through panachage, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Preference votes in Municipi

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female (β)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)	
CrossVoting	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006*** (0.002)
NonPartisan	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Female X CrossVoting (θ)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.003)
Female X NonPartisan (σ)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.003)
Incumbent		0.120*** (0.004)	0.123*** (0.004)	0.149*** (0.004)	
Age		0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	
Ranking		-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	
Left-wing			0.030*** (0.004)		
Civic list			0.052*** (0.007)		
R-squared	0.156	0.312	0.323	0.578	0.922
N	9006	9006	9006	9006	9006
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in Municipi in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023. In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties' voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through panachage, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Preference votes in Municipi, by party of the candidate

Party of the Candidate	Civic Lists			Left-wing parties			Right-wing Parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.009)		0.019** (0.009)	0.025*** (0.007)		-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	
CrossVoting	0.010 (0.011)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010** (0.005)	0.014 (0.009)	0.014* (0.008)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)
NonPartisan	0.004 (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female X CrossVoting	-0.035* (0.022)	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.035*** (0.009)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009** (0.004)
Female X NonPartisan	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.016* (0.009)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.004)
Incumbent	0.095*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.009)		0.181*** (0.012)	0.198*** (0.011)		0.124*** (0.005)	0.144*** (0.004)	
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)		0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	
Ranking	-0.027*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)		-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)		-0.019*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	
R-squared	0.470	0.747	0.940	0.539	0.660	0.895	0.370	0.474	0.919
N	1611	1611	1611	1677	1677	1677	5718	5718	5718
Municipal FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in Municipi in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023, distinguishing candidates by ideology. I restrict the analysis to candidates belonging to civic lists in columns 1 to 3, to candidates belonging to left-wing parties in columns 4 to 6, and to candidates belonging to right-wing parties in columns 7 to 9. In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through panachage, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Preference votes in upper legislative elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	
Female X CrossVoting	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Female X NonPartisan	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
CrossVoting	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
NonPartisan	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Federal	0.134*** (0.008)	0.119*** (0.009)	0.109*** (0.008)	
Incumbent		0.030*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.003)	
Age		0.000** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	
Ranking		-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	
Left-wing		0.007 (0.007)		
Civic list		0.058** (0.027)		
R-squared	0.249	0.321	0.732	0.960
N	11760	9840	9840	11760
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in cantonal and federal legislative elections (respectively for Gran Consiglio and Consiglio Nazionale) in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023. In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through cross-voting, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Federal is a dummy variable equal to 1 for federal elections and zero for cantonal elections. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Preference votes in upper executive elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.048** (0.018)	-0.042* (0.021)	-0.039** (0.017)	
Female X CrossVoting	-0.032** (0.012)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.032*** (0.011)
Female X NonPartisan	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.019* (0.011)
CrossVoting	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.010 (0.018)	0.009 (0.006)
NonPartisan	0.005* (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.017)	0.005 (0.006)
Incumbent		0.248*** (0.050)	0.272*** (0.031)	
Age		0.002** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	
Ranking		-0.019* (0.011)	-0.003 (0.005)	
Left-wing		0.024 (0.015)		
Civic list		0.192** (0.089)		
R-squared	0.028	0.229	0.521	0.957
N	660	534	534	660
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in cantonal executive elections (for Consiglio di Stato) in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023. In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through cross-voting, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Preference votes in Municipi, by size of the city

Population	=< 1000			1000 – 5000			> 5000		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.026* (0.013)		0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)		0.004 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	
CrossVoting	0.002 (0.020)	0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006** (0.002)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007** (0.003)
NonPartisan	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)
Female X CrossVoting	-0.010 (0.040)	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.022*** (0.005)
Female X NonPartisan	0.005 (0.039)	0.005 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.011)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.005)
Incumbent	0.027 (0.018)	0.087*** (0.013)		0.127*** (0.006)	0.148*** (0.005)		0.136*** (0.008)	0.158*** (0.007)	
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	
Ranking	-0.043*** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)		-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)		-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	
Left-wing	-0.035 (0.030)			0.029*** (0.006)			0.013** (0.005)		
Civic list	-0.023 (0.023)			0.060*** (0.008)			0.065*** (0.016)		
LFP	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	
Female LFP	-0.100*** (0.029)	0.006 (0.040)		-0.013*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)		-0.004 (0.011)	0.020 (0.017)	
Share 20-34	-0.428 (0.855)	-1.039 (1.401)		0.155 (0.153)	-0.611*** (0.210)		1.213*** (0.348)	0.634 (0.461)	
Share 35-49	0.557 (0.790)			0.231 (0.242)			2.596*** (0.405)		
Share 50-64	1.022 (0.680)	1.164* (0.629)		-0.152 (0.176)	-0.503** (0.210)		2.237*** (0.570)	1.053 (0.653)	
Share 65+	-0.363 (0.520)	-0.394 (0.556)		0.105 (0.118)	-0.304*** (0.105)		0.676*** (0.192)	0.021 (0.194)	
Share uni degree	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.014** (0.006)		0.001*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)		-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	
Urbanization rate	-0.032* (0.017)	-0.007 (0.022)		0.016*** (0.004)	0.013* (0.007)		0.017* (0.009)	0.017 (0.013)	
R-squared	0.175	0.702	0.919	0.283	0.534	0.919	0.302	0.502	0.920
N	735	735	951	4536	4536	5598	2181	2181	2457
Municipal Controls	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in Municipi in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023, distinguishing candidates who run in smaller versus larger cities. I restrict the analysis to candidates running in municipalities below 1000 inhabitants (columns 1 to 3), in municipalities between 1000 end 5000 inhabitants (columns 4 to 6), and in municipalities above 5000 inhabitants (columns 7 to 9). In the regressions, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through panachage, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Cross-Voting in Municipi, within and across ideologies

Cross-Voting from	Same Ideology			Different Ideology		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.004** (0.002)
Incumbent	0.061*** (0.004)	0.061*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.045*** (0.005)	0.049*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.004)
Age	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Ranking	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Left-wing		-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.005)		0.024*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
Civic list		-0.001 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.012)		0.035*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.003)
Share Pref.			1.138*** (0.055)			0.981*** (0.037)
R-squared	0.354	0.357	0.579	0.298	0.324	0.544
N	3449	3449	3449	5731	5655	5655
Municipal Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes. The table regresses panachage votes on candidates' control variables in Municipi, distinguishing among votes cast by voters of the same ideology, and votes cast by voters of a different ideology. Among the covariates, I include dummy variables to control for female candidates, incumbent politicians, left-wing candidates, and candidates belonging to civic lists. Moreover I control for individual popularity within the party with the share of preference votes collected within the party (Share Pref.). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Gender differences among voters

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep Var.	Fed. Turnout	Cant. Turtout	Panachage	Pref. women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.0249 (0.0153)	-0.0206 (0.0232)	-0.0521* (0.0281)	0.0139*** (0.0050)
Age	0.0049*** (0.0004)	0.0040*** (0.0007)	-0.0039*** (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Married	-0.0299*** (0.0078)	-0.0519*** (0.0116)	-0.0134 (0.0151)	0.0016 (0.0026)
Catholic	0.0811*** (0.0170)	0.1069*** (0.0271)	0.0229 (0.0310)	-0.0097* (0.0050)
High Education	0.0488*** (0.0164)	0.0679*** (0.0262)	0.0101 (0.0292)	0.0080 (0.0052)
Left	0.0041 (0.0185)	0.0437 (0.0282)	0.0880*** (0.0322)	0.0266*** (0.0067)
Center	-0.1212*** (0.0187)	-0.0718*** (0.0272)	-0.0081 (0.0373)	0.0121** (0.0049)
Urban	-0.0043 (0.0210)	-0.0441 (0.0290)	-0.0185 (0.0369)	-0.0013 (0.0102)
Constant	0.4810*** (0.0422)	0.5748*** (0.0584)	1.0291*** (0.0685)	0.0547 (0.0343)
R-squared	0.076	0.066	0.093	0.164
N	3347	1436	1057	2450
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes. The table documents survey responses of inhabitants of Canton Ticino regarding their voting habits. Dependent variables are Turnout in Federal and Cantonal elections (columns 1 and 2), the likelihood of using panachage (column 3), and the preference for female politicians (column 4). Controls include the dummy variables Female, Married, Catholic and the discrete variable Age. High Education is a dummy equal to 1 if the voter has a university degree. Dummies Left and Center control for political ideology. Urban is a dummy equal to 0 for citizens living in rural areas, and 1 otherwise.

Table 14: Share of female candidates in party lists

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share female candidates (t-1)	0.275*	0.278*	0.278*	0.470**
	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.181)
Gender gap in Cross-Voting (t-1)	-0.085**	-0.084**	-0.082	-0.195**
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.075)	(0.087)
Left-wing (t)		-0.033	-0.033	
		(0.043)	(0.044)	
Civic list (t)		-0.010	-0.010	
		(0.050)	(0.052)	
Gender gap in Pref.Votes WP (t-1)			-0.003	0.090
			(0.077)	(0.093)
R-squared	0.136	0.138	0.138	0.661
N	90	90	90	90
Party FE	-	-	-	YES

Notes. The table documents the gender composition of the list in elections at time t for Municipi, as a function of party covariates in elections at time $t-1$. The dependent variable is the share of female candidates running with party p at time t . The independent variables are “Share of female candidates (t-1)” (the share of female candidates in the same party in the previous election), a dummy “Gender gap in Cross-Voting in t-1” (equal to 1 if female candidates performed worse than male candidates in panachage) a dummy “Gender gap in Pref.Votes WP in t-1” (if female candidates collected less preference votes within the party than males), and dummies Left-wing and Civic lists to control for time invariant party ideology. Standard errors are clustered at party level.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A Online Appendix

Table A.1: Performance in Consigli, by party of the candidate

Party of the Candidate	Civic Lists			Left-wing parties			Right-wing Parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female (β)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)		0.005*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	
CrossVoting	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
NonPartisan	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female X CrossVoting (θ)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Female X NonPartisan (σ)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Incumbent	0.037*** (0.002)	0.043*** (0.002)		0.048*** (0.002)	0.052*** (0.002)		0.036*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.001)	
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	
Ranking	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	
R-squared	0.330	0.719	0.940	0.530	0.655	0.904	0.291	0.481	0.912
N	6339	6339	6339	5475	5475	5475	20808	20808	20808
Municipal FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in Consigli in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023, distinguishing candidates by ideology. I restrict the analysis to candidates belonging to civic lists in columns 1 to 3, to candidates belonging to left-wing parties in columns 4 to 6, and to candidates belonging to right-wing parties in columns 7 to 9. In these regression, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through panachage, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Share of female politicians in Consigli

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share female candidates (t-1)	0.616*** (0.116)	0.569*** (0.124)	0.564*** (0.125)	0.509*** (0.127)
Gender gap in Cross-Voting (t-1)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.019 (0.035)
Left-wing (t)		0.063 (0.062)	0.063 (0.062)	
Civic list (t)		0.038 (0.028)	0.038 (0.028)	
Gender gap in Pref.Votes (t-1)			0.011 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.034)
R-squared	0.327	0.352	0.353	0.775
N	99	99	99	99
Party FE	-	-	-	YES

Notes. The table documents party choices (w.r.t. the gender composition of the list) in election at time t for Consigli, as a function of party covariates in elections at time $t-1$. The dependent variable is the share of female candidates running with party p at time t . The independent variables are “Share of female candidates (t-1)” (the share of female candidates in the same party in the previous election), a dummy “Gender gap in Cross-Voting in t-1” (equal to 1 if female candidates performed worse than male candidates in panachage) a dummy “Gender gap in Pref.Votes WP in t-1” (if female candidates collected less preference votes within the party than males), and dummies Left-wing and Civic lists to control for time invariant party ideology. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: Preference votes in upper executive elections, controlling for education

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.050*** (0.017)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.041** (0.017)	
Female X CrossVoting	-0.032** (0.012)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.032*** (0.011)
Female X NonPartisan	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.019* (0.011)
CrossVoting	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.010 (0.018)	0.009 (0.006)
NonPartisan	0.005* (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.017)	0.005 (0.006)
Tertiary Education	0.018 (0.037)	-0.030 (0.035)	0.029* (0.016)	
Incumbent		0.256*** (0.050)	0.265*** (0.031)	
Age		0.002* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	
Ranking		-0.019* (0.011)	-0.002 (0.005)	
Left-wing		0.021 (0.017)		
Civic list		0.190** (0.086)		
R-squared	0.029	0.234	0.525	0.957
N	660	534	534	660
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	YES

Notes. This table compares the performances of candidates in cantonal executive elections (for Consiglio di Stato) in different categories of votes in elections from 2016 to 2023. In these regression, I include all the shares of votes collected by a given candidate, i.e. the share of votes cast by party supporters, the share of votes cast by opponent parties voters, and the share of votes cast by non-partisan voters. The dependent variable is the number of preferences cast for the candidate in each category, over the total number of votes cast for all the candidates within his/her list in the same category. CrossVoting is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by opponent parties' voters through cross-voting, while NonPartisan is a dummy 1 identifying the votes cast by non-partisan voters. Female, Left-wing, Civic list and Incumbent are dummy variables, while Age is continuous variable. Ranking is the ex-ante position of the candidate within the list, decided by the party. Standard errors are clustered at party level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.